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THE STUDENT AND THE SECONDARY SOCIAL STUDIES
CURRICULUM
Kieran Egan
Simon Fraser University
INTRODUCTION
This paper is an attempt to see what kind of secondary social studies cur-
riculum we might design if we take as our starting point the students' chang-
ing and developing forms of cognition . We do this intuitively and
informally anyway . Any good teacher has a sense of what kinds of things
students find most engaging and most readily understandable, and is daily
involved in the complicated task of combining this sense with a notion of
what kinds of things are educationally most valuable and socially useful .
Out of this complex combination comes the curriculum .
But it's a difficult job, and we could do with some theoretical support .
The problem is that there do not seem to be any theories around that can
help. Most psychological theories of development seem minutely interested
in the first years of life and seem to exhaust themselves by the time students
reach secondary school . They also don't much focus on the kinds of things
educators are interested in. Even Piaget's theories, which are recommended
to us so insistently, seem to say very little of practical utility in the
classroom . Any social studies teacher recognizes that students go through
quite profound changes in their focus of interest in, and understanding of,
social studies material during the course of their secondary school years, yet
Piaget's theory of intellectual development recognizes no significant
changes within the stage of what he calls "formal operations ." Indeed, no
developmental theory recognizes a change or development that reflects what
is for educators a common observation .'
My purpose here then is to generate a theory based on commonly observ-
able changes in students' educational development during their secondary
school years, focusing first on apparent developments in those forms of
students' cognition of most interest to educators and then seeing what kind
of curriculum these changing forms of cognition suggest . 2 That is, I will
work from a characterization of what seems most engaging and meaningful
to "ideal normal" students, to a curriculum that seems best able to
encourage development of their forms of cognition in desirable directions .
Given the space restrictions of this essay, I will be concerned less with
setting out such a curriculum in detail as indicating the principles which
should govern its design .
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In the first section I will characterize briefly what seem to me the main
characteristics of typical students' cognition as they enter their secondary
schooling . For reasons given below I call this stage of development
"romantic ." In the second section I will do the same for the later years of
secondary schooling . I call this later stage "philosophic." In the next two
sections I will consider what implications follow from these characteri-
zations for the social studies curriculum . In the final section I will briefly
discuss the conclusion of all this .
THE ROMANTIC STAGE
As students enter their secondary schooling we see the development of
somewhat rudimentary but serviceable concepts of historical time, geo-
graphical space, physical regularities, logical relationships, causality, and so
on. Concepts, that is, on which an understanding of other places and other
times in some real sense becomes possible ; concepts that seem to be
integrally related to the development of what we tend to call vaguely
abstract thinking . This development seems to begin in some students as
early as nine or ten years and in others around twelve or thirteen years-that
seems to be roughly the range of normal .
Prior to this the main conceptual structures children had available for
making sense of the world were those derived from their "inner"
experience, and their perceptions "uncorrected" by the above concepts of
"otherness." That is, the world was conceived not as an impersonal,
objective entity . Such a conception is the achievement of a mature
rationality . The child's world was full of entities charged with, and given
meaning by, those emotional and moral concepts the child learns first and
best-things like love, hate, joy, fear, good, bad . The world was thus
absorbed into the child's vivid mental life, and this colored and charged
their environment with a meaning derived from "within ." Piaget expressed
this well when he notes that at this earlier stage there is "a sort of confusion
between the inner and the outer, or a tendency to fix in objects something
which is the result of the activity of the thinking subject" (Piaget, 1931) .
The development of the concepts of "otherness" leads to a sense of an
autonomous world that is separate from and indifferent to the students'
thinking . With this development comes the students' need to reestablish
their connections and relationships with this newly perceived world. They
have to establish their intellectual security and sense of identity within it .
How do they do this?
It seems to me that the main tool used is what I will call "romantic associ-
ation," That is, they initially overcome the threats of this new and alien
world by associating with those things in it which most clearly transcend the
threats the world poses, i .e ., with the powerful, the noble, the courageous .
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An association with the ingenuity and courage of Ulysses or Captain Kirk
of the Starship Enterprise, or with the nobility and determination of
Florence Nightingale or St . Teresa of Avila, involves the student's ego in the
implicit claim that "I could do that too," or, rather, "I am doing that too ."
Students no longer need to fear the vast mysterious world that is opening up
before them because they can transcend every threat by means of romantic
associations . By such means the threats are transmuted into adventure .
This process of romantic association supports and indeed glorifies the
immature ego . Romantic students essentially deify themselves . And this
seems necessary for the establishment of a first security within a world of
alien reality. It is not a fault or vice that needs to be eradicated as quickly as
possible. It seems sensible to feed it with knowledge of the powerful and
transcendent in every discipline, both to help students develop through this
stage, and to help them feel in themselves the power and glory of the real
world. Their glorified identities derive simply from identifying with the
glorious .
While involved with these romantic associations-"hero-worship" being
the most obvious example-students have also to be engaged in the
somewhat conflicting task of accommodating their thinking to how the
world in fact works . That is to say, students have to develop their
"romantic" sense of identity within the context of reality . The typical
method by which students seem to set about discovering what is real and
possible in the world is to search first for its limits, to find the borders
within which reality exists .
A defining characteristic of the move into the romantic stage, then, is the
development of a quite sudden fascination with the extremes of what exists
and what is known . In the earlier stage, for example, the sense of scale pays
no heed to the limits imposed by reality ; going towards the King's throne,
the hero may have to pass a series of guards, the biggest of which is three
miles high and the smallest of which is no larger than your thumb nail . At
the romantic stage, students' interest in scale similarly focuses on the
extremes, but is constrained by reality . Thus, The Guinness Book of World
Records fascinates the romantic student, with its accounts of the biggest,
the smallest, the fastest, the highest, the furthest, and so on . It is between
such extremes that students locate reality, and within them that they
construct their identity .
I call this stage romantic, then, because it shares with romanticism the
tension that comes from the desire to transcend a threatening reality while
seeking to secure one's identity within it .
An important characteristic of knowledge that engages students at the
romantic stage is that it tells them something about what is real and pos-
sible. The impossible fantasies of the mythic stage are quite suddenly
treated with contempt as "stupid kids' stuff ." A further characteristic
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required for knowledge to be engaging at this stage is that it be different,
different from everything mundane and conventional, different from every-
thing the students have known and experienced . Just as romantic explor-
ation of the real world begins with the probing of its limits, so it is the fan-
tastic and spectacular that the romantic perception highlights . Von Daniken
and Velikowski are more interesting guides to history than Toynbee or
Marx .
This romantic search for limits enables students to explore the vastness of
the worlds of nature, culture, and history, to get a sense of their size and
scope, and a sense of what is real within them . This is the period of sniffing
around and establishing boundaries; only when boundaries are securely
known does one turn and explore the world within them .
One reflection of students' desire to explore limits and to form personal
associations with whatever is to be learned leads students to want to know
"What was it like then, or there, or doing that?" They want to sense
different forms of human life, but not in the way that a typical scholar
might. Their concern is to feel different forms of life, to try them on .
Realistic detail becomes important . And the more different from the
student's experience, the better. Incas and an imaginary Martian Colony
have a head start over the histories and lives of their grandparents . The
association is made personal not through proximity of relationships or
physical familiarity, but through those human qualities that lead to a tran-
scendence over the everyday and commonplace world. Grandparents' lives
can, of course, be made engaging by these principles, but in general it seems
to me much easier to engage typical teenage students at a romantic stage
with a medieval scholar/saint like Ramon Lull than with knowledge about
grandparents' lives . On the same grounds it is not the development of their
own society that will be most engaging, but that of the most exotic and
bizarre societies. Having established a sense of the limits of possible
societies,, they will have a framework to begin making sense of their own .
Before developing such a framework, details of their own society will
remain largely meaningless in any educational sense.
A further aspect of students' search for limits during the romantic stage is
evident in the development of obsessive hobbies and pastimes . There is a
desire to learn something exhaustively or collect something completely ; to
know the score of every football game played by the team with which an
association is formed; to collect every postage stamp of a particular era and
place; to know every detail of the life and collect every photograph of a
film-star or member of royalty ; to know the shape of every leaf of every
tree; to know everything about Saturn; or about costume through the ages .
It is a kind of intense specialization, but I think it is more properly seen as a
further expression of the desire to find the limits of things . By exhaustively
knowing something, one gets a sense of the scale of everything .
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Another important conceptual development, and one which seems
integral to how students at this stage make sense of things, may perhaps best
be seen in the kinds of stories that appeal to students during this stage . A
"romantic story," in the sense of I mean it, is one in which a hero or
heroine (or institution, nation, idea, etc .) with whom or with which the
reader may identify struggles against odds to a glory and transcendence over
threatening nature (or events, institutions, ideas, nations, etc.), in which
glory the reader may then share. Such stories have a crucial characteristic
that makes them ideal for this stage-they are ego-supporting . They allow,
and encourage, the reader to associate with some noble and powerful force
that achieves success against a threatening world . Occasionally they allow
the hero or heroine to die or lose, but only in a context which enables the
reader deliciously to share the hero's or heroine's moral or other
superiority, which is not recognized by the unfeeling world . 1 r6
Buhler calls the stories that most appeal at this stage the "Hans Christian
Anderson-type" (Buhler, 1930) . They have more complex plots than the
Grimm-type stories which appealed at the previous stage. They are
"realistic." Even when they deal with imaginary worlds, there is always a
concern with realistic detail or plausibility . They have clear and powerful
heroes and heroines . They tend to have exotic, though realistic or plausible,
settings. They are often concerned with the differences between people who
have more complex motives than in the Grimm-type stories . Their meaning
is always clear, in the sense that readers know clearly what they should feel
about the events and characters . Buhler mentions Robinson Crusoe as a
paradigm of this kind of story . One might add much of science fiction,
adventure stories, animal stories, and so on .
Stories are apparently one of the few cultural universals. Everyone,
everywhere, seems to have used stories . What are they used for? Stories are
the linguistic unit which alone can fix the emotional, or affective, meaning
of events .' They are thus important not merely as entertainment, but
because they give us clues about how students best make sense of the
world-make sense of the kinds of events which constitute a large part of
the social studies curriculum. That is, we can learn from the form of the
stories that appeal so strongly to students at this stage something about the
form in which we should organize social studies content in our teaching .
This is a theme which will be elaborated below .
I have suggested three general principles that move us towards a charac-
terization of students' cognition at this romantic stage : "romantic
associations" with elements that transcend mundane reality ; a search for
limits and extremes to get a sense of the scale of the real world ; and the use
of the story-form to establish a clear emotional meaning for events .
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THE PHILOSOPHIC STAGE
There seems to be quite a profound change in the kinds of social studies
content many students are engaged by during the later part of their
secondary schooling . This change seems to take place in some students at
about fourteen or fifteen years, and in others not till their college
years-that seems about the range of normal .
The main feature of this change seems to be that at the romantic stage,
students' perception focused on the extremes, on the most fascinating bits
and pieces, on vivid "true" stories, on dramatic events and ideas, on bizarre
facts, on heroes and heroines, and on some particular areas in great detail .
There was, of course, the realization that all these were parts of the same
world, but the connections between the parts were not a matter of much
concern. Students "connected" themselves with these elements directly, by
means of romantic associations . One aspect of the move from the romantic
to the philosophic stage may be seen in the strengthening realization that all
the bright bits and pieces are interconnected parts of some general unit .
History, for example, is increasingly seen as less a set of stories, a set of
styles of living, and more as a continuum of styles, a single complex story .
With students' perception of the world as a unit, in which everything is in
some vague way related to everything else, comes the realization that they
too are a part of the unit . Instead of retaining a romantic transcendence
over the world, they come to realize that they are largely determined by their
place in it . That is, students begin to sense that they are what they are, not
as a matter of their romantic choices, but because the laws of nature,
human psychology, social life, and historical development apply to them as
to everyone else . The direct romantic connections to the bright bits and
pieces are dissolved in the growing realization that their proper
"connection" to the world is by means of enormously complicated causal
chains and networks. This shift involves the realization that they are not as
free as they had thought ; they are entrammelled in the world as in a spider's
web .
As with the transition to the romantic stage, this is a period of critical
educational importance . The relatively rapid decay of the romantic world
view requires that students establish a new kind of intellectual security
within this newly perceived world . To do this they have to establish their
place and their roles in the natural, social, and historical processes of which
they are becoming aware . From being transcendent players, they have to
become agents .
The means whereby this new security is established follows from
students' perception of themselves as parts of complex processes . If they are
parts of complex processes then the way to understand their proper roles
within them is to find out the truth about these processes . The major
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defining characteristic of the philosophic. stage, then, is the search for the
truth about human psychology, for the laws of historical development, for
the truth about how societies function . That is, the philosophic focus is on
the general laws whereby the world works . By knowing these, the students
will know their proper place and roles, - and so they will securely know
themselves .
Whereas at the romantic stage students developed a sense of the limits of
reality, a sense of its scope and scale, at the philosophic stage they turn
inward and conduct a general survey of the real world, and begin to chart a
mental map of its general features.
In The Poetics, Aristotle distinguishes between history on the one hand
and poetry or fiction on the other, on the grounds that the former is
concerned with establishing particular truths whereas the latter is concerned
with more general or "philosophic" truths-the historian is concerned with
whether this or that happened whereas the "poet" is concerned with what
happens of necessity, with the general laws of things. It is on the basis of
this distinction that I call this stage philosophic . Students' interest is little
engaged by particular knowledge for its own sake ; it is primarily engaged by
the kinds of pursuits Aristotle thought proper to the "poet," that is, finding
very general truths about natural, social, psychological or historical
process .
The endless particulars which students learned during the romantic stage,
and which were made meaningful by romantic association, now threaten to
be merely chaotic bits and pieces littering the mental landscape . To be made
"philosophically" meaningful requires that they be organized within some
general scheme. The first move of this "mental map-making" stage is to
establish a sense of the main features and their relationships and locate the
particulars within the general context .
At the philosophic stage, for example, a student might be attracted by a
fairly simple form of Marxism because it offers a means of readily
organizing a vast range of particulars . It provides an enormously general
scheme by means of which all history, all the phenomena of the past (and
present and future, too) can be reduced from their unmanageable diversity
to a relatively simple process . Once one understands the process, "the laws
of history," then the details may be swept up, slotted into their places in
the process, and so be made meaningful . All that knowledge learned at the
romantic stage about knights and peasants and the great artists of the
Renaissance, suddenly is endowed with a new meaning as part of the decay
of feudalism and rise of the bourgeoisie . That is, the meaning of the
particulars is now derived primarily from their place within the general
scheme .
Such a general scheme, which determines the meaning not only of the
past but of the present and future as well, also provides students with a
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means of understanding their proper roles as agents within the historical
process. If they accept the simple Marxist view, for example, they know that
their proper role in Western societies should involve them in exacerbating
the contradictions of capitalism, hindering the plans of reactionary
bourgeois forces, and furthering the cause of the proletariat . If they accept
a liberal progressive view, their roles as agents will involve them in defend-
ing and strengthening the liberal institutions of their society.
The philosophic craving for generality is the means whereby chaotic
particular knowledge about the world is reduced to manageable
proportions. This urge towards the general leads students to develop the
abstract intellectual tools necessary for imposing order on the most complex
phenomena.
Thus, quite suddenly, very general concepts-like "society," "culture,"
"the mind," "evolution," "human nature," and so on-become
prominent in students' language and thinking . The complex of social inter-
actions, of institutions, of people and their jobs and families, of buildings
and forms of transport, and a million and one other things, are reduced to
concepts like "society" or "culture," and may be juggled with a few
equally general concepts to establish for the students enormously general
principles about how the world works . From these they form ideologies and
metaphysical schemes; intellectual tools with which they can organize,
simplify, and reduce even the greatest complexities with casual confidence .
Ideologies and metaphysical schemes represent the boldest lines that give
order to the students' mental map of the world . They become the fixed
coordinates by means of which all particulars and details are located and
given meaning .
Another reflection of this urge towards imposed order is the development
of hierarchies . If one begins to appreciate music at this stage, the philo-
sophic impulse is to ask who is the best composer (or football player, or
actor, or, which is the best automobile, or whatever), and the second best,
the third best, and so on . The impulse at this stage is towards discovering
the most powerful criterion that will allow one to organize all composers (or
football players, or actors, or automobiles, or whatever) by slotting them
into place in a hierarchy . Frequently this leads to the imposition of single-
criterion hierarchies where they are inappropriate, where multiple-criteria
should be applied .
The philosophic students' prime requirement, however, is to get some
kind of control over the bewildering, and threatening, diversity of the
phenomena under consideration. The philosophic impulse is to establish a
first general ordering on some useful criterion . The refinements, and
sophistications can only follow an initial general ordering .
This search for the criteria by which things may be ranked in hierarchies
is a development from, but also different from, the romantic collecting and
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organizing of something in great detail ." The focus of interest at the philo-
sophic stage has moved from the particulars to the principles by which the
particulars may be ordered . At the romantic stage, the particulars and their
immediate relationships provide the focus of interest . The "philosophic"
concern with recognizing "the-best"-composer, is not a romantic search for
extremes, rather it is a part of the philosophic search for a criterion whereby
all composers can be ranked .
This might seem a regression rather than a development . The "philo-
sophic" generalizations might seem very crude and simple-minded
compared with the complexity of the "romantic" organization of some
phenomenon. But it is the generation of very abstract "philosophic"
ordering concepts that will eventually permit much more powerful and
refined organization . Romantic stage organizing lacks the power of
"philosophic" general schemes, and lacks the potential for bringing diverse
phenomena into complex processes .
Once one has identified the right criterion for evaluating and ranking
composers, or comedians, or novels, or football players, or once one has
found the ideology that shows the truth about the historical process, one
can feel confident in dealing with particular composers, novels, or historical
facts and events ; it becomes a simple job of slotting them into place . It is a
characteristic of students at the philosophic stage to be confident, or over-
confident, that they know the meaning of everything . Indeed, the abusive
observation often made about students at this stage is that "they think they
know everything." This is precisely so . They do think they know the true
meaning of everything, even of things they have not yet learned . That is,
they think they understand the general principles from which the meaning
of particulars is derived ; thus knowing the truth in general, learning and
organizing the particulars is seen as essentially a trivial task .
At the romantic stage, students' prime means of access to knowledge was
by association with those things that helped them feel transcendence over
the treatening complexity of the world . The prime means of access to
knowledge at the philosophic stage is a development from this . Security
now is sought not in transcending the world, but in finding one's proper
place within it, and this is discovered by understanding the truth about it .
The primary association at the philosophic stage, then, is the Truth .
Similarly, students' interest at the romantic stage was engaged by those
things that supported a sense of transcendence . At the philosophic stage,
students' interest is engaged primarily by the knowledge which helps "body
forth" the general schemes which they identify as expressing the truth about
historical, psychological, social, or natural processes. For example, if one
accepts the simple Marxist ideology, then one's interest is focused by that
onto the particular knowledge that best ' clarifies and supports it.
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The intellectual achievement that establishes the student in the philo-
sophic stage is the relatively rapid transition from romantic interests to
finding very general principles or "laws." The success of this transition
turns on the power or sophistication of the general principles of "laws" that
the student generates . By "generates" I don't mean that students formulate
such principles of laws for themselves, or originate them . There is, however,
a sense in which students "make them their own" by adopting them to the
particular knowledge, values, attitudes and so on, that individual students
organize . I mean "generate" in this restricted sense .
The power or sophistication of the general principles turns largely on the
amount and variety of particular knowledge the student has which the
principles are generated to organize . This seems to lead to a most
unfashionable conclusion : to a significant degree, educational development
beyond the romantic stage depends on the student knowing a lot . That is, a
sheer quantity of knowledge is educationally important .
Educational development through the philosophic stage may be
characterized in terms of the increasing sophistication of the student's
general schemes. What causes the schemes to become increasingly
sophisticated? Primarily, it seems to me, more knowledge .
It is the constant interaction between general scheme and particular
knowledge that fuels the student's development through this stage . The
general scheme demands further knowledge to clarify it, the further
knowledge demands refinements and revisions in the general scheme, which
in turn requires further knowledge to more fully body forth the newly
refined or revised vision . The "fuel" of this process is nothing less than the
difference between reality and the general scheme which seeks to mirror it .
Between reality and the idea lies the fuel of "philosophic" inquiry .
Why does not the particular knowledge simply "body forth" the general
scheme satisfactorily, and so not fuel constant further inquiry? Because
additional particular knowledge will usually contain what I will call
anomalies for the general scheme. The more knowledge the student
acquires, the more likely it is to generate anomalies, and so require revisions
in the general scheme, which in turn will require further inquiry, the
accumulation of yet more knowledge, which in turn will contain further
anomalies which will lead to increasingly sophisticated general schemes .
What is an anomoly in this context? If, for example, a student developed
a fairly simple Marxist view of the historical process and looked for particu-
lar knowledge to support it, things like the modern persistence and growth
of western bourgeois societies or the apparent survival and enrichment of
some of the English landed aristocracy during the seventeenth century
present anomalies . To account for the knowledge the student acquires
about these need not destroy the general scheme, rather such knowledge will
normally lead to a more sophisticated Marxist vision . To use different
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language, one might say that 'the growth of particular knowledge sets up a
dissonance that can only be corrected by altering the general scheme .
Again, I need to qualify somewhat my claim about a simple quantity of
knowledge being needed for development through this stage . In addition,
knowledge that is anomalous, -or creates dissonance, for the student's
general schemes is most valuable . I want to defend my insistence on the
need for a large quantity of knowledge, however, because it seems that, as it
were, a critical mass of knowledge is required to get the dialectical process
between general scheme and particular knowledge moving, and a good deal
of further knowledge is required to keep it going .
One of the problems that follows from accumulating only a relatively
small amount and range of knowledge at the romantic stage, and
consequently generating only very crude general schemes at the transition to
the philosophic stage, is that very crude general schemes hinder the process
whereby anomalies lead to increasing sophistication . The problem with a
crude general scheme is not that it does not organize enough knowledge, but
rather that it can organize anything . If it is crude enough, everything
becomes evidence to support it, and nothing challenges it . With such crude
general schemes formed at the critical transition stage, students may
thereafter increase their knowledge, but that knowledge will not force
revision and sophistication of their general scheme, and so will contribute
nothing to increased understanding . Such knowledge will tend to remain, to
use Whitehead's term, "inert ." In cases like this, students will establish
only a toe-hold in the philosophic stage .
I have, then, suggested four general principles that move us towards a
characterization of students' cognition at this philosophic stage : the per-
ception of general processes in the world rather than bright romantic bits
and pieces; concern with the truth about these processes; meaning derived
from the general scheme ; and the fuel of the developmental process through
this stage being the accumulation of knowledge which contains anomalies to
the general scheme.
CURRICULUM IMPLICATIONS FOR THE ROMANTIC STAGE
What follows for the design of the social studies curriculum from the
principles outlined in the first section? There seem to be two major kinds of
implications; one concerned with the form and organization of material so
that it may be most meaningful to students at the romantic stage, and the
second concerned with particular content .
The most general and profound implication for the form or organization
of curriculum content, and indeed for the structure of the curriculum itself,
follows from seeing the romantic stage as the period during which students
explore the limits of the reality with which they have to deal . The kind of
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curriculum structure this seems to lead to contrasts quite starkly with the
"expanding horizons" principle that underlies social studies curriculum at
present . The "expanding horizons" curriculum (most evident in the elemen-
tary grades but still informing the secondary) is based on the assumption
that students discover the world by progressively moving further
"outwards" along lines of content associations, whereas the characteristics
outlined above suggest that students explore reality by first making contact
with its most extreme limits and then working "inwards ."
It is perhaps not surprising that this stage of intellectual wonder and
excitement is also the stage of most acute boredom . If the mind is not
caught up and flying in wonderful realms, it has to descend into the every-
day world against which it has developed little conceptual defense . The
mind at the romantic stage largely lacks the means to derive much meaning
from the everyday world . It does not yet know the context in which the
everyday and commonplace are meaningful. For this reason alone, a
curriculum that focuses on local matters and shuns the distant and different
will likely lead to boredom, and those well-meaning teachers who try to
engage students in what is "relevant" assume that the "relevant" is found
in their everyday environment, are simply helping to alienate students from
the world by denying them the route of access to it which they most need .
While indulging in polemic I might equally criticize those scholars and
teachers who have a precise sense of how their discipline should be studied,
and who consider the kind of knowledge that engages students at the
romantic stage as in some way disreputable . Romantic-stage students seem
like wide-eyed tourists interested only in the spectacular sights, and bored
by the background and detail that most interests these scholars and
teachers. Such teachers find their educational duty in ridiculing the
romantic search for the extreme and the kind of knowledge that this entails,
and they concentrate on trying to turn students into mini-researchers. It is
hard to pursuade some people that the immature require immature concepts
and methods of inquiry, and that this romantic engagement with the
awesome, the wonderful, the different, is not only acceptable but necessary
for students' educational development .
At a more particular level of organizing a unit or a lesson, however, this
same principle has important implications . It suggests that, instead of
seeking out whatever is familiar and developing our lesson or unit from
that, we should seek out the most distant and "different" aspect of the
topic, then connect the students with it by means of their romantic
association with transcendent qualities . For example, in typical units on the
Industrial Revolution teachers often begin from things which seem to have
an immediate content association with the students' experience, so they may
elect to deal first with children of about their students' age working in coal
mines. The principle outlined above suggests finding something distant
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from their experience-a Victorian engineer like Isambard Kingdom
Brunel, perhaps-and then "connecting" the students with him, engaging
their interest in him and the Revolution he made, by giving examples of
Brunel's fascination with doing only the impossible, with his courage,
energy, confidence, power . That is, one connects the students with those
transcendent forces which they have access to and a craving to associate
with and which are the forces that are embodied in the Industrial
Revolution ."
Similarly, when teaching about ancient Greece or Rome, teachers focus
on those aspects of ancient life that have something in common with today
(for example, family life and homes), or with things that have left a direct
and clear mark on the present, like words derived from Greek and Latin . A
criterion for selecting what is to be studied in the past, is what "content"
students may be familiar with in the present . Some teachers who find these
content associations trivial, argue that knowledge of ancient Greece and
Rome is thus "irrelevant" to typical modern high-school students . Other
teachers frequently defend the "relevance" of Greece and Rome on the
grounds of these content associations with the modern world . What seems
to follow from the above characterization is that content has little to do
with relevance, which may be achieved at this stage by romantic association
with some transcendent human quality . And, to run the risk of overstating
the point, the more alien the world with which students can be connected,
the more "relevant" is knowledge about it to their educational
development .
The potential obsessive fascination with detail once "connection" has
been made with any topic must determine some of the learning activities
that will form a unit . The tendency to "cover" a body of material at the
same level of detail must, it seems, be resisted . At the romantic stage the
student requires both a general context that engages interest, and an
opportunity to fasten onto some area in minute detail . If one is teaching a
unit on the Renaissance explorers, for example, it would be well not to be
concerned solely with who went where when, but to look in minute detail at
how a ship was stocked, exactly how much and what kinds of food would be
on board, what kind of people formed the crew, what were their
backgrounds and expectations, what was the detailed structure of a typical
ship, who slept where, what facilities and powers did each member of the
crew have, and so on. One might want to compare in such exhaustive detail
a ship and voyage of an English venturer, like Drake, with a Portugese or
Spanish exploratory journey, or with Columbus' voyage to America . This,
of course, requires that the teacher makes available the sources students can
go to for this kind of information . Initially, the more attractive the source
materials the better but once students become interested they will ransack
the dullest sources with a sense of excitement that is fed rather than dimin-
ished by the dullness or relative inaccessibility of the source .
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The remaining implication about form concerns the story-form . Stories
have beginnings that set up expectations, often by the conflict of opposite
forces, they have middles that develop or elaborate these expectations, and
they have ends that satisfy them. Stories are unlike reality in that they have
beginnings and ends ; they hack out of reality an artificially distinct chunk,
and this allows the establishment of determinate meaning in the events that
make up the story . We know we have reached the end of a story when we
understand the meaning of all the events that make it up . Stories, as I have
said above, are our machines for determining how people should feel about
particular events . Students at the romantic stage require some quite clear
affective orientation to the events they are learning in order that they be
most meaningful . Thus, it seems to follow, content organized to be best
understood by students at this stage needs to be organized within a story-
form . I do not mean that students need to be told stories about the content,
or as a part of the unit, but that the unit must be organized by using the
basic principles of the story-form .
The principles outlined for the romantic stage seem to say more about
matters of form than they do about particular content. But we can draw
some implications about the choice of the particular content that should
make up the curriculum for this stage .
In general we will look for that content which is most "romantic" in the
sense developed above ; that is, things that are in some sense most vivid,
most transcedent, most distant from students' mundane experience . We will
look, in history, for the major expressions of human energy and
creativity-the greatest things done and thought ; the building of the
pyramids and cathedrals; the careers of the greatest "heroes" and
"heroines" ; the most dramatic conflicts ; the most moving events; the
bravest exploits ; and so on. It will be a curriculum full of drama and
vividness, but which makes little attempt to convey a systematic and
synthetic view of the general historical process-that should be the concern
of the next stage . Our concern during this romantic stage should be to give
students access to the widest range of knowledge, and encourage their
development of a sense of the romance of the human intellectual, as well as
other, adventures .
A study of geography, or economics, or sociology, or political science,
should follow the same principle and search first for the dramatic and vivid
extremes of the subject . In geography one might focus on the titanic forces
that formed the planet as we know it . While I have forgotten most of the
geography I was taught, I retain a vivid sense of the processes and results of
glaciation, because it was taught in such a way that the mighty forces of the
retreating ice were made almost tangible .
Content at the romantic stage seems to be most engaging if access to it is
provided through human beings and especially the transcendent qualities
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which are a part of certain people's characters . Much otherwise "dull"
knowledge in, say, geography can bi made dramatic and engaging by
conveying it through the "biography" of the person or people who
originally discovered it . At its most trivial this might involve teaching
Canadian geography, say, not as a finished body of knowledge all laid out
for the students to learn, but as a discovery made step-by-step through the
adventures of the people who first discovered the various features . To see
the physical features through the hopes, courage, endurance, despair of
people, is to make them humanly meaningful .
A final principle that seems to have implications for the content to be
taught during this stage comes from one of the characteristics of the philo-
sophic stage . From the sketch of students' developing cognition given in the
philosophic stage it seemed that the power of the general scheme students
will develop will be determined by the amount and range of knowledge
accumulated during the previous stages . A crude mass of knowledge about
a wide variety of things seems important for further educational
development. Apart from its value in moving into and through the next
stage, such crude accumulations of knowledge have an aesthetic value of
their own for the individual. Only people without such treasures depreciate
their value, and it is inappropriate to accept the advice and guidance of the
ignorant in matters of education .
CURRICULUM IMPLICATIONS FOR THE PHILOSOPHIC STAGE
Here again we may consider the curriculum implications of the character-
ization of the stage under the headings of form and content .
The most general implication concerning the form of content at this stage
leads to a paradox . I have suggested that students' focus of interest, and
source of meaning, at this stage is the general or paradigmatic, but also that
this is the stage for detailed study of particulars . The paradox is resolved, I
think, in the dialectical process where the general scheme stimulates
particular inquiries, and anomalies among the particulars stimulates elabo-
ration of the general scheme . The implication, then, is that this should be a
stage of specialization but that the specialization be open constantly to
general laws, theories, ideologies, . metaphysical schemes, etc. Sensitivity,
and knowledge, will be required for the teacher to be able to guide students
to specialize in a topic that, firstly attracts students because it will help to
"body forth" their general scheme, and secondly will produce the kinds of
anomalies that will best ensure revision and elaboration of their general
scheme .
As for the content at this stage the kind of unit that is suggested by the
outline of students' cognition might involve, for history, a study of what we
might call meta-histories. If the students' are concerned with forming or
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developing general schemes, we might provide them with a variety of such
schemes from which they might choose one, or combine features of a
number .
An important principle for such a unit is that the various schemes should
not be simply laid out dispassionately as a kind of smorgasbord, as all
equivalent and equivalently false, the way an atheist might study compara-
tive religions . The students may be expected to make a commitment to the
truth of one, or a composite of their own making, so they must be presented
as important and conflicting theories about the historical process-which is,
after all, what they are .
The unit could be divided into sections, each one of which outlines,
elaborates, and then applies a general scheme . One might begin with a
Thucydidean notion of history as a tragic process, in which, human nature
being what it is, political harmony will always be undermined by greed, self-
deception and folly, and destruction will result . An outline of Thucydides'
account of the fall of Athens could introduce the section. With selected
readings from his History one could present his image of the Periclean far-
sighted moderation that led to Athens' glory; then the crazy ambitions of
Cleon and Alcibiades which led to its destruction in the campaign that
finished so unbearably in the harbor at Syracuse . With use of media one
could vivify the movement of armies and shifts of alliances and power .
Role-playing of crucial speeches to the Athenian Agora and the terrible
Melian dialogue, can bring life and drama to the ancient conflict between
Athens and Sparta . This needs to be organized to emphasize Thucydides'
"philosophic" message about the historical process .
Having developed a clear sense of the tragic general scheme, students may
be asked to consider whether it is true of some other complex historical
event, like the fall of the Roman Empire . That is, one must first choose to
elaborate students' sense of the general scheme by using it to organize a
phenomenon that may be fairly easily fitted to it . Thereafter students may
be asked to consider how far it is true of any other civilization they may
wish to examine .
In similar fashion other sections of the unit might consider a Rankean
notion of a God-guaranteed progress of nation-states towards greater
power and harmony ; a Toynbeean image of rising and falling organic
civilizations ; and Hegelian/Marxist image of dialectical progress through
class struggle ; a Spencerian evolution ; a Spenglerian vision of the declining
west. A teacher could choose among these or other general schemes .
In addition the teacher might throw in the occasional enormously general
"philosophic" idea . For example, civilization may be seen as the product of
some kind of energy whose center has been traveling westward around the
world at increasing speed . It began slowly moving from China, through
India to the ancient middle eastern empires, then passed on to Egypt, then
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to Greece, and the Roman empire . After the fall of Rome, it passed to the
Frankish Empire, and then to the most westerly European empires of Spain
and England . They drove westward to the Americas, and their decline saw
the rise in power of the eastern part of north America. More quickly it
passed across the continent to the-west coast . The teacher may ask students
how well such an "idea" fits history, what it means, what kind of energy it
is, and whether the focus . of energy seems due to reach China again in the
near future . Similar ideas might involve seeing the development of
civilization from the .perspective of weather cycles, food production, and
epidemics and control of diseases . A focus on the dynamic of historical
change will stimulate "philosophic" interest .
Such meta-histories should always focus on the nature of man as an
historical animal, his role in the causal network of events, and should also
allow speculation and projection into the future, and concentration on the
meaning of the present in each scheme . After each presentation of a
scheme, students should be assigned to apply it to some other area of
history. Debate, argument, discussion among students should be
encouraged . Once students develop a commitment to some general-scheme,
they should be asked the kind of probing question about some particular
historical event or period that will stimulate the , dialectical interaction that
will carry them through this stage .
Similarly for other areas of the social studies, one should approach the
detail through the most general principles, theories, laws, etc. The world
should be presented as a series of processes, which involve the student as an
agent within them .
I have already stressed the importance of a sheer quantity of knowledge
seeming to be important for educational development into this .stage. For
example, if students know very little history, they may simply be unable to
generate any principles or "laws" useful for imposing general order on the
historical process. If they know equally little about other subjects too, and
so are unable to generate equivalent principles to organize them, then they
will lack the means to develop educationally beyond the romantic stage .
That is to say, having enough knowledge to be able to generate from it some
general vision of a complex process, some ideology, or metaphysical
scheme, is a prerequisite for moving beyond the romantic stage and into the
philosophical stage of educational development . Similarly, to continue
developing through this stage, an increasing accumulation of knowledge is
necessary to provide the anomalies that will lead to establishing the general
schemes .
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CONCLUSION
My main concluding comment on the status of the theory sketched above
can best be expressed in the words Plato used about his educational theory :
"heaven knows whether it is true ; but this, at any rate, is how it appears to
me" (Republic) .
A second item I would like to stress, even though I have mentioned it a
number of times above, is that the appropriate environment for educational
development is made up primarily of knowledge. Focusing on educational
development brings knowledge to the forefront because it is the fuel of the
process, it is the environment which provides aliments for the process to
unfold, it is the reactive agent to the proactive functioning of the
appropriate genes . Without knowledge there is no education; with little
knowledge there is little education . There may be ignorant happy people,
and ignorant psychologically well-adjusted people, and ignorant socially
well-integrated people, and ignorant physically strong people, and ignorant
good people-but there are no ignorant educated people. If a person is
largely ignorant of the world and lacks the conceptual distinction and
categories that only knowledge can provide, that person lacks the means to
develop the capacities on which progressive unfolding educational
development depends .
So, to return to our beginning, what seems to follow for the secondary
social studies curriculum from starting with a characterization of students'
developing cognition is a structure and content which appears quite
different from what we have today . Indeed, it appears so different that one
is daunted. Perhaps this theory is wildly inaccurate in its characterization of
students' developing cognition, or perhaps the implications I have drawn
from the characterization to the form and content of the curriculum is
extremely sloppy. If not, it is our current curriculum that needs radical
reform .
FOOTNOTES
'I should except Plato from this . He distinguishes between a stage he calls
dianoia and a later stage he calls noesis .
'The theory I move towards here draws somewhat from work I have done
before, which will appear in my forthcoming book Educational
Development (New York: Oxford University Press) .
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-'For an elaboration of this see my "What is a plot?" New Literary
History 6 (Spring, 1978), 454-73 .
4This, and other examples, are given in more detail in Educational
Development.
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EDUCATIONAL RESEARCH: VALUES AND VISIONS
OF SOCIAL ORDER
Thomas S . Popkewitz
University of Wisconsin
If these conditions (of social science being historically influenced)
make trouble for us as social scientists, remember that they are a great
advantage to humanity, by leaving men the illusion of choice . I speak
of the illusion because I myself believe that what each of us does is
absolutely determined . (George Homans, 1967)
It is often thought and said that what we most need in education is
wisdom and broad understanding of the issues that confront us . Not at
all. What we need are deeply structured theories in education that
drastically reduce, if not eliminate, the need for wisdom. (Patrick
Suppes, 1974)
The above statements are part of more general treatises about the nature
of social research . The authors argue for social/psychological sciences
which provide explanatory statements about human behavior .' They
believe the power of the explanations lies in their objective, culture-free
quality. Yet, as the quotes suggest, the very search for scientific reasoning
reflects commitments which go beyond the coherence of findings or
methods . Underlying the practice of social research are assumptions about
society . These assumptions refer to the nature of social control, order and
responsibility . Far from being neutral, inquiry is a human process of under-
standing which involves hopes, values and unresolved questions about
social affairs .
The purpose of this paper is to explore the values of educational research
and its implications for social education . The argument will focus on the
social and cultural implications of research . The concern will be how theory
and methods give legitimacy to certain educational and cultural patterns .
The purpose is to locate the political and sometimes ideological functions of
professional work .
EDUCATIONAL RESEARCH AS A CULTURAL IMPERATIVE
Social research expresses human commitment and value in at least two
ways.' First, research may respond to our perceptions of social and cultural
conditions . It enables us to reconcile possible social contradictions and to
consider the consequences of institutional arrangements . Durkheim's
studies of religion and education, for example, have social and historical
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meanings beyond those traditionally associated with their descriptive
reliability . Durkheim's studies give focus to his deep moral concern about
urban and industrial changes in the late 19th century .
Secondly, social research has a highly -valued status in society . Many
people believe that political, social and educational issues require scientific
solutions. Deliverance from the domination of nature and from social
oppression requires expert knowledge. In the following discussion, these
two cultural dimensions of social research will be explored .
Much of the sociology of science emphasizes the community aspect of
scientific inquiry (Hagstrom, 1965 ; Storer, 1966) . A scientific discipline, it
is believed, exists as a social organization . It contains certain norms,
standards and lines of reasoning which provide underlying rules for judging
the worth of individual research. Individuals are socialized into a particular
community and tend to accept the existing definitions of problems and
methods. For example, a U.S. economist typically will think about
"capital" and "production" and express findings mathematically. A
cultural anthropologist, in contrast, documents and interprets events as
"culture" and expresses them in narrative form . However, because sociali-
zation is not totally coercive, many different points of view may exist within
a single discipline. These disagreements can produce intense debate about
which research questions and methods of study are appropriate . Mulkay
(1972) argues that these conflicts and the resultant cross-fertilization of
ideas are vital to scientific imagination and creativity .
The conflict within the social sciences should be considered in the larger
context of social and cultural commitments . Disciplinary disagreements
often involve an interplay of political, methodological, and epistemological
issues (Horowitz, 1968) .
This conflict can be illustrated in recent debates within the field of
education . For example, learning psychologists have dominated the
intellectual work of education . Educational psychology tends to focus upon
student performance and the interchange between students and teachers .
Recently, however, sociologists of educational knowledge have challenged
the educational psychologists' assumptions about the study of schooling
(Karabel and Halsey, 1977): These sociologists believe that learning
psychology deflects attention from the way schools legitimize certain types
of cultural knowledge and interests .
This criticism of conventional educational research defines alternative
methods. Sociological approaches emphasize the relationship -between
institutional patterns and individual consciousness . In defining a different
purpose and method for study, these criticisms challenge deeply held beliefs
about the social meanings and purposes of educational research .
We can illuminate the relationship between research and social conditions
more clearly by focusing upon the purpose of research . Rather than a
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rationalization for existing conceptions, inquiry can be viewed as a search
for new metaphors for thinking about everyday affairs . The metaphors are
"lenses" which enable people to give coherence to daily events that before
seemed incomprehensible or troubling . The genius of Einstein and Keppler,
for example, was their ability to put the physical world into sharp focus,
different from what others accepted as common sense . The new lenses
enabled scientists to consider different forms of questions and produce
greater depths of understanding . The importance of the systems of thought
provided by Freud, Marx, and Weber, as well, was to orient people to feel,
see, and think about their social and personal lives in new and different
ways . The metaphors of "unconsciousness," "ideology," or "bureauc-
racy" permitted people to conceive of social reality as having many
different layers of interpretation, some of which were not readily apparent
in everyday life . The concepts focus on the pretentions, deceptions, and
self-deceptions which people use to cloak their interactions .
Social and cultural affairs influence the search for new metaphors in the
social sciences . TOennies' Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft, a classical work
in sociology, articulated his sense of a loss of community brought about by
industrialization. Weber's notion of bureaucracy reflected an attempt to
rationalize social and economic affairs which were occurring . Durkheim's
theme of anomie represented a spirit of pessimism, moral uncertainty, and
dislocation of norms produced in a period of material progress (Nisbet,
1976). In more recent times the Civil Rights movement and protests against
the Viet Nam war brought new themes for study to the research community .
For example, political scientists and many social studies educators became
concerned about problems of political legitimacy and socialization
occurring in this relatively unstable period . Some scholars studied school
practices, curriculum materials, and community life which they thought
influenced the learning of minorities. Curriculum designers in social studies
education, as well, responded to the conflicts in society by developing value
clarification, public issues and citizenship education programs .
Educational researchers are members of their culture and inherit its
history (Schultz, 1973) . Their work contains assumptions developed and
sustained in everyday conversations, behaviors, and events . Social theory,
for example, uses language drawn from everyday conversations . The form
and content of the language reflect beliefs, commitments and values .
Theories of totalitarianism, important in the 1960's, were built on people's
daily experiences . Totalitarian theories grew out of the 1950's debate about
a "cold war ." People in this country found themselves with allies who had
been enemies just a few years before during a large-scale war . The new
forces of evil were communism, not fascism . One response to the new
situation and its alliances was to generate theories about totalitarianism .
These theories not only reflected the changed situation, but lent credibility
to our new political allies .
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This discussion has, to this point, focused upon two cultural dimensions
of social research. First, the creativity of inquiry has sociological as well as
psychological characteristics . Research exists within and is supported by a
community of discourse . Second, the nature and character of scientific
work is responsive to the larger - social world . The social researcher
participates in everyday conversations and uses those dialogues as a back-
ground for occupational endeavors. The cultural quality of research,
however, is not complete until a third dimension is considered : a scientific
community is a product of the social world .
Science does not stand by itself but is a cultural artifact . Status is given to
scientific knowledge in business, political and social institutions . Political
leaders use scientific techniques to "poll" people about their actions and
policies . Industrial psychologists and organizational researchers provide
information about how to organize labor. Economic theorists guide
peoples' interpretations about the relationship between work, capital and
consumption. Historians interpret America's past which helps establish a
collective identity (see Zinn, 1970) . Curriculum researchers apply scientific
thought for selecting, organizing and evaluating schooling . In everyday
choices, science is viewed as making life more manageable and -social
problems more solvable . Social science is in demand and seems a necessary
component of our everyday consciousness .
The cultural imperative of scientific thought can be illuminated by
comparing Western science with the African Azande (Winch, 1977) . The
Azande maintain a system of magical thought which constitutes a coherent
universe' of discourse similar to science . It provides an intelligible
conception of reality and a clear way of deciding which beliefs are and are
not in agreement with that view of reality . Poison oracles or ghost rites to
influence rainfall exist within a context of rules and conventions which gives
these actions a sense of significance .
The Azande rationale is no less intelligent than the logic of science
practiced by anthropologists who study these people. Its principles and rules
arise out of the course of human conduct and are subordinate to existent
cultural beliefs. The magic rites explain and justify those beliefs . The way of
thinking found in Western science would be incomprehensible to the
Azande. In fact, science, would seem to them to have many of the same
irrational "magical" qualities that Western anthropologists see in Azande
culture when judging solely by logical "-scientific" rules . The Azande or the
anthropologists' structure of thought is significant only within the context
of larger social forms .
23
EDUCATIONAL THEORY AS POLITICAL AFFIRMATION
At first glance, the suggestion that theory and research methods contain
political values may seem misleading, if not in error. Our assumptions
"tell" us that theory is objective and neutral . Theories, it is believed, give
coherence to data and expression to human regularities . The previous
discussion, however, suggests that theories are products of human
ingenuity. In this section, the nature of social values in research will be
considered by focusing upon how theories justify social action .
Theory has at least three political functions in educational discourse .
Theory can (a) provide a rationale for changing social and economic
conditions which enables these changes to seem reasonable, (b) provide a
mechanism to legitimize institutional interests, and (c) give direction to
consideration of alternative social arrangements .
Social theory can provide symbolic coherence to changing social,
political and economic conditions. Alvin Gouldner (1970) argues that social
theory is not so much a determination of "facts," but an effort to make
sense of unresolved experiences and to interpret the meaning of one's life .
The dominant sociology of the 1930's, Gouldner argues, was a conservative
response to the crisis of the times . The fundamental posture of sociological
theory was to accept dominant institutions in order to maintain traditional
loyalties and avoid discontinuities . In a similar discussion, Merelman (1976)
defines social science as a social organization which responds to larger
social institutions . This response often creates new symbols of harmony and
hope in times of changing social order. The changing political world after
the 1930's 3 brought an encroachment of political activities into what had
been previously considered private affairs (Merelman, 1976) . Government
extended its activities by creating social security, unemployment insurance
and corporate and agricultural subsidies . This rapid encroachment brought
with it a sense of political impotence to individuals .
Behavioral political scientists provided an organized response to these
changing social conditions . Political inquiry created political symbols which
reestablished the idea of community . These symbols included political
culture, pluralism, and political socialization . Interestingly, many of these
symbols are used today to justify educational practices such as decentral-
ization and citizenship education . Political inquiry also developed
methodologies which enabled people to believe they were being consulted,
such as "polls" or surveys of public opinion . The theory and methods of
political science helped reduce strain between the changing role of
government and the beliefs people cherished about public life .
The introduction of "new" theories of instruction or curriculum can be a
way of helping people to cope with larger crises in social and political
conditions. For example, the late 1960's and 1970's have produced a
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"crisis of values." An Asian -war, urban riots, and government lawlessness
such as Watergate, FBI, and CIA activities have thrown basic values of
American life further into question .
In this social context, many social studies educators have used theories
about "moral development" and "values clarification" to orient
curriculum development. The concept of "values clarification," for
example, helps explain and give coherence to social conditions which
otherwise seem without purpose. The theories of values, in turn, serve
institutional functions . Value theories justify the use of therapeutic
approaches (Lockwood, 1975) in situations where students and parents have
questioned the efficiency of institutions .
The recent and extensive attention to "individualized" education can also
be considered within a social and institutional context . The sanctity of the
individual has received increasing ideological support since the early. 19th
century. Out of the French Revolution came a definition of the individual
as free from religious and feudal restraints . The development of Western
industrialization and the fragmentation of community life expanded the
need for an ideology of individual inviolability .
The notion of individualism is an . increasingly potent symbol in
education . The social efficiency curriculum of David Snedden responded to
individual ."needs" of the early 20th century -,(Drost, 1967) . Progressive
educators, as well, developed programs to respond to the "uniqueness" of
individuals . Criticism in the past two decades has focused upon the routine,
standardized nature of instruction . Phillip Jackson (1968), for example,
argued that too much of schooling is formed around the grouping process
and batching of children. This social organization of schooling eliminates
spontaneity, creativity, and the pursuit of individual interests .
"Individualized instruction" is a contemporary response to the belief
that social institutions should consider personal fulfillment as essential . The
theories of individualization provide ways for individuals to .believe that
schools are responsive to human differences . Many educators, for example,
adopt management and learning theories to . provide a rationale for
"individualized" program development . These theories guide educators in
identifying `.`systems" for organizing teaching and instruction. Curriculum
content, for example, is subdivided into different levels or degrees of
difficulty. Materials are organized sequentially and children paced
"individually" through the defined work . A contrasting model of
"individualized instruction" exists in the British Infant School, which
stresses the nurturing of "self" through social interaction .
Theories of moral development and individualization have political
potency. They provide symbols which help people to express a variety of
emotions asociated with schooling . These theories enable people to resolve
contradictions between the values they hold and the actual conditions of
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schools . The theories of pedagogy symbolically tie together seeming
discontinuities and social strains, bringing reassurances of ethical
commitment and institutional adaptiveness . The theories make it appear
that professionals have a grasp of what should be done . Reassurances,
however, do not necessarily alter or explain what actually occurs in schools .
THEORY AS LEGITIMATION
Closely tied to the "strain" function of theory is legitimation . Statements
which result from educational research enable certain structures and
interests in school affairs to seem normal and reasonable. Legitimation
occurs in at least two ways . First, theories have underlying values and
beliefs that dispose us to act. Second, the organizing categories of theory
define what is often taken for granted about institutional life .
The legitimating function of theory can be understood by realizing that
theory has different layers of meaning . A typical way of considering theory
is through its explicit statements, i .e ., what is overtly said about schools,
curriculum or students . For example, many recent social studies programs
are based on political theories which encourage interest in group
participation. Therefore, curriculum developers may propose that :
"Students have more positive attitudes about school if involved in decision
making." This statement has nonobvious meanings . It contains a series of
unpostulated and unlabeled assumptions about the world . The theory of
participation, for example, may "treat" the world as highly integrated and
people as rational . These assumptions will guide people seeing and
experiencing political activities . Participation may be considered to mean
rational involvement in publicly sanctioned groups, such as a student
council. The assumptions about participation also create attitudes about
how institutional structures should be challenged . Lack of participation, for
example, may be viewed as lack of individual motivation rather than as an
institutional defect. Remedies, then, are those which enable students to feel
politically capable, such as courses in student participation "skills ." The
courses, however, may not deal at all with the structural reasons that some
students, such as low income groups, fail to participate . Such courses may,
in fact, increase the students' sense of inadequacy . While designing
curriculum, the assumptions and prescriptions of a political theory are
treated as "real" and not scrutinized for possible latent implications or
consequences .
The social categories researchers accept to guide their inquiry can also
serve to legitimize school structures. Often educational research is initiated
in response to some administrative action and is guided by the
administrator's definition of the problem. Many curriculum research
projects accept the objectives of pedagogical programs and are organized to
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"explain" how the means helped reach the objective . In a social studies
curriculum project, for example, the research focused on whether the
course material was learned, whether the teachers perceived the material to
be clear and easy to use, and how well students understood and achieved
project goals (Angrist, Mickelsen and Penna, 1976) . The results of the
research did not question, but assumed the premises of the project, i .e ., that
knowledge from the social sciences should be distributed equally in
schools." The consequence is an ad hoc curriculum theory that justifies the
agreed-upon design of the project administrators .
"Basic" research, as well, often assumes that the administrative
categories of schooling are nonproblematic . A recent article on teacher
pedagogical decisions, for example, was concerned with how teachers make
instructional choices based on information processing (Shavelson, Cadwell
and Izu, 1977) . The empirical problem was to present a group of graduate
students in education with information about student aptitude, children's
ages, family status (divorced, number of siblings, etc .), children's use of
time in school and intelligence . Sometimes the information was negative,
i .e ., the child did not do his or her homework or the father was a machinist
rather than an engineer . A second session for teachers was held to provide
more information . The teachers were asked to revise instructional decisions
based on the above information . The conclusion of the study was (a) "sub-
jects may use different kinds of information to make different kinds of
decisions"; (b) " . . .decisions at time one and time two were influenced by
other factors not measured in this study" (Shavelson et al ., 1977, p . 95) .
With such common sense conclusions, one might ask what the function
of such research is . The question can be answered in two different ways .
Methodologically, researchers tend to believe that through the slow
accumulation of data some important generalizations about teaching will be
made. Furthermore, there seems to be a technical elegance to the report
itself, especially when data collection, literature and review findings are
succinctly and carefully presented, and sophisticated techniques such as
path analysis increase data manipulation .
The social impact of the research, however, overshadows its
methodological elegance. It has social and political ramifications which are
as important as the tests of reliability. First, people tacitly accept
institutional assumptions, some of which are defined by school
professionals themselves . Achievement, intelligence and "use of time" are
accepted as useful variables for stating problems about schools and these
categories provide the basis for research . Inquiry enables researchers to see
how school categories relate, but it does not test assumptions or
implications underlying the school categories . For example, there is no
question about the nature of the tasks at which children spend their time .
Research conclusions are conceived within parameters provided by school
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administrators . Second, researchers accept social myths as moral prescrip-
tions. Social class, social occupation (engineer or machinist) or divorce are
accepted as information which should be used in decision making. These
assumptions maintain a moral quality and criteria which may justify social
inequality. Third, the research orientation tacitly directs people to consider
school failure as caused by those who happen to come to its classes . Social
and educational assumptions are unscrutinized .
One could say at this moment that this is only research . It is not how
people make decisions. I would argue, however, that research often has a
way of entering into the domains of school interaction . People adopt the
categories and definitions for understanding their own and others' actions .
The research orientation defines as well as responds to the school situation .
Educational administrators, curriculum developers and teachers use the
research to direct their practical activities, and the effect is to limit and
predispose individuals in their actions and conceptions of educational
possibilities .
THEORY AS ALTERNATE POSSIBILITIES
Theory can also direct attention to the possibility of alternatives . Open
education is a case in point (Tabachnick, 1976) . Its followers have
developed a consistent set of statements which orient people to think about
different institutional forms . Open education searches for ways in which
students could develop more autonomy in social relationships . Mutuality of
roles, community and reciprocity of relations are perceived to be central to
the structure of school experience and are measures of its outcomes . ,
Open education theories provoke thought about alternative institutional
structures . The North Dakota Study Group on Evaluation, for example,
uses theory to develop a consistent relationship between the ethical purposes
of schooling, its curriculum methods, and evaluation procedures . It is one
of the few attempts to explore systematically the relationship between
ideology, practice and research . Tabachnick (1976) has argued that open
education theories can direct the formation of social inquiry curriculum . He
suggests that there is a mutual relationship between open education and
social inquiry in schools, the latter giving emphasis to an active search for
knowledge and individual responsibility .
In conclusion, educational theory is a form of political affirmation . The
selection and organization of pedagogical activities give emphasis to certain
people, events and things. Educational theory is potent because its language
has prescriptive qualities . A theory "guides" individuals to reconsider their
personal world in light of more abstract concepts, generalizations and
principles . These more abstract categories are not neutral ; they give
emphasis to certain institutional relationships as good, reasonable and
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legitimate. Visions of society, interests to be favored and courses of action
to be followed are sustained in theory .
RESEARCH PRACTICES AND VISIONS OF SOCIAL ORDER
Thus far, I have focused the argument upon the implications of
educational research. I have considered the cultural nature of inquiry and
the politics of educational theory . I would like to focus now upon the
practices of study. The purpose is, again, to shift the argument away from
conventional discourse about the reliability and validity of scientific
endeavors . While important, such scrutiny is unable to shed light upon the
cultural values actually represented. If science is a cultural activity, an
adequate understanding of the truth of its statements must include
discussion of cultural definitions . In particular, questions should be
considered which illuminate value statements about social affairs embedded
in the practices of study .
As with theory, the suggestion that research practices embody values goes
against conventional wisdom . Researchers often argue that methods are the
only factors in science . Kerlinger (1973), for example, defines methods of
inquiry as procedures in which beliefs have no effects . The character of
method, he argues, remains entirely independent of our beliefs,
perceptions, biases, values, attitudes and emotions .
The stance of neutrality is itself a value stance . It expresses a belief and a
hope of researchers . As I will argue, the procedures of inquiry contain
assumptions about social relationships which are interrelated with theory
and human purpose .
One approach to considering values in practice is to look at techniques . In
many ways, the techniques of' study are treated as skills which exist
independently of the purpose or commitment of those who do research . The
professional preparation of researchers, for example, consists of courses in
statistics, field study or survey research . It is assumed that these, techniques
of data collection and analysis can be learned as specialized skills apart
from the actual process of inquiry . The techniques, to phrase the problem
somewhat differently, are conceived of as neutral to the conduct of study .
A critical scrutiny of techniques yields a different perspective . Techniques
emerge from a theoretical position and therefore reflect values, beliefs and
dispositions towards the social world . Factor analysis, for example, was
created as a measurement procedure for faculty psychology and was based
on the assumption that the mind has different compartments which could
be trained as independent units (Hamilton, in press) . While faculty
psychology has been discredited, its techniques are still in use, thus
maintaining the assumption that the mind is a cluster of parts .
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Fox and Hernandez-Nieto (1977) argue that mathematical models for
research articulate value preference and underlying assumptions about
social relations. Conventional statistical techniques, for example, are based
on Euclidean geometry which has linear conceptions of time and space . In
contrast, newer mathematical models contain dialectical principles . The
development of the new models for research derives, in part, out of a
theoretical and value commitment to include dimensions of free will,
intention and historical setting .
The choice of technique is a moral responsibility . Moral questions are
deeply intertwined with the general commitments of science . Social
scientists, for example, are concerned with developing verifiable
knowledge. This interest involves manipulating variables to test outcomes
of a hypothesis and the predictive quality of theory . This commitment poses
no dilemma to most physical or life scientists-they can change the heating
temperature to combine elements or experiment with hybrid feed without
any moral guilt . In high energy physics, molecular biology or medical
research, the manipulation of variables often does have direct implications
for human beings . Various ethical and legal restrictions have evolved from
this research .
Questions of morality and immorality are always involved in social
research since the "subjects" of social scientists are people . The problem of
controlling variables is a moral one . It is immoral, Homans (1967) argues,
to manipulate people . The alternative is to create statistical techniques
which provide scientists with the necessary tools to manipulate data .
It is certainly less easy in the social sciences than in some physical and
biological sciences to manipulate variables experimentally and to con-
trol the other variables entering into a concrete phenomenon . . . . It is
less easy to control the variables because it is less easy to control men
than things . Indeed it is often immoral to try to control them : men are
not to be submitted to the indignities to which we submit, as a matter
of course, things and animals . Hence the relative prominence in some
of the social sciences, even increasingly in history, of other methods of
controlling variables, methods thought somehow less satisfactory,
such as the use of statistical techniques . (Homans, 1967, p . 22)
IDEOLOGY AND METHODS
The relationship between technique and value implies that educational
research is based upon certain background assumptions and consequences .
These implications can be illuminated by looking at the particular
commitments to science that underlie much conventional research. These
commitments are : (a) Social science is to be modeled after the physical
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sciences. (b) Social science is a deductive system of propositions which
report the law-like qualities of human affairs. These laws are to explain and
predict the actions of individuals in a manner similar to those developed in
the physical sciences . (c) Objectivity is important to social science . This is
the ability of the observer/recorder to develop techniques that place the
data outside (away from) the particular meanings, interpretations and
values of social situations and researchers . (d) Objectivity is obtained
through rigorous techniques which produce "hard" data that express events
as numbers rather than words . Mathematics is important to these beliefs
and commitments to science because it eliminates ambiguities (43 % is 43 %)
and human values .
These commitments and related research practices produce a pattern in
which problems, methods and theory interrelate as a self-sustaining and
almost self-justifying system . The significance of this research pattern is
that peculiar definitions are given to social problems and social order .
The commitment to rigorous techniques tends to narrow the focus of
research to those aspects which can be numerically expressed . In a recent
study of teacher effectiveness (Cooley, Leinhardt and McGrail, 1977), for
example, the authors discussed student outcomes as involving dimensions
such as citizenship, attitude towards learning, conceptions of "self,"
creativity and achievement . However, since achievement is the only
dimension which has reliable testing, achievement was treated as the
primary interest . Rigorous techniques of the study enable us to learn less
and less about the social affairs we researched . David Easton (1971) argues
that an important dimension of educational theory is that it be relevant to
social problems. However, as illustrated above, the commitment to rigorous
techniques has removed that dimension and, in fact, hinders the search for
understanding our human condition. Questions of human values and
politics are ignored .
Another consequence of conventional research is related to objectivity .
Some researchers maintain the belief that there are regularities or laws of
human nature which lie outside personal intentions and motives . The belief
in an underlying natural order has a direct impact upon how data is
obtained, i .e., objective data require mathematical expression which
eliminates human-values and ambiguity from science . This commitment to
objectivity requires a view of the world as certain and crystallized . 6
The assumption that the world is certain influences social practice .
Sociological researchers suggest that people can only pretend to play a role
for so long . After awhile, the role becomes real . The form of playing is the
reality . The quote by Homans cited at the beginning of this paper suggests
that determinism is an a priori value of some research . What was originally
a methodological device is now a view of the world which includes
definitions of how people should act, believe and feel .
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The pedagogical sciences provide a case in point . Researchers often
define the purpose of education as "changing children to some desired
end." Educational theories are the technical apparatus that guide the
manipulation of children . Experimental techniques are implemented as the
means of instruction . Behavior modification is thought of as a teaching
strategy. The moral hesitancy of social scientists to intervene in human life
is often nonexistent when it comes to schooling .
The belief that teachers are human engineers is exemplified in a popular
book on curriculum development entitled Instructional Product Develop-
ment (Baker and Schultz, 1971) . The authors define curriculum design as a
technological problem which involves stating educational results in terms of
precise, observable performances of children . For example, an acceptable
objective of a history lesson might be to teach a student to "order four wars
of the 19th century chronologically" (p . 10). The goal of educational
research is to find more efficient ways of obtaining correct performances
from children . To test these performances, criterion-referenced measures
are constructed . They provide clear, precise test items that refer to
objectives (i .e., a child lists wars chronologically) . The authors define
professionals as "personnel" whose function is "management of human
resources which will lead to more efficient administration of instruction and
the greater likelihood that prescribed outcomes will be attained ." A
professional's task is to measure teaching efficiency and a researcher's task
is to identify levels of mastery .
Educational change theories maintain similar assumptions about people,
schools and research. Change oriented research is often concerned with how
experts (change agents) can encourage participants in an organization to
accept the administrators' reforms (see, for example, Popkewitz, 1976b) .
Psychological and organizational research on "change" provides
information which enables the change agent to manipulate the people or
situation to achieve the desired results . A healthy organization is defined as
one which accepts the change agent's definitions . A traditional organization
is defined as one in which there are close, personal ties, and this social affili-
ation makes it less easily manipulated through outside intervention
schemes. Change practices carefully control, through piecemeal additions,
the established order of things. People are defined as recipients of values,
and human capabilities as functionally related to existing structures . The
ethical implications of how educational institutions are organized, or the
nature of expectations upon school participants, are not deemed important
for scrutiny .
In much curriculum thought and educational reform, the science of
education is translated into a technology . Choices exist only when they
make the existing system more rational, efficient and controllable . Science
is administration of people ; research is a team effort, user-oriented and
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devoid of the imagination described earlier . The skepticism and self-
criticism which characterize'scierice - are made irrelevant . Curriculum is no
longer an ethical task . In fact, the technical nature of professional work
makes the image of the Renaissance man, as Baker and Schultz (1971)
suggest, an image "for his time, 'not ours ."
The image of educational science exudes a belief that "the laws" of
nature or the knowledge of human existence have been discovered and are
available to implant in children . Educators manipulate and control children
as physical scientists manipulate objects of the physical world . Although the
belief that the laws of social life are known is a chimera, human engineers
act upon educational affairs as though there were not difficulties or
uncertainties. The ceremonies and rituals of research give the practice
legitimacy and sanctity . The moral implications of control, dominance, and
power are eliminated from discussion when the only problem of schooling is
considered to be implementing technologies .
The concept that educational science is similar to the physical sciences is
an ideological one . Gouldner (1970) argues, for example, that behind
methodologies and techniques is a belief that (a) people might unite in order
to subdue a "nature" that is regarded as external to man, and (b) technol-
ogies might be developed which would transform the universe into a
"usable" resource of mankind as a whole . These assumptions led to a belief
that people could control the rest of the universe and have the right to use
the universe for their own benefit. When the assumptions of the physical
sciences were applied to studies of people, specific problems arose .
The humanistic parochialism of science, with its premised unity of
mankind, created problems, when the effort was made to apply science
to the study of mankind itself. It did so partly because national or class
differences then became acutely visible, but also, perhaps more
important, because men now expected to use social science to
"control" men themselves, as they were already using physical science
to control "nature." Such a view of social science premised that a man
might be known, used, and controlled like any other thing : it "thing-
afied" man . The use of the physical sciences as a model fostered such a
conception of the social sciences, all the more so as they were develop-
ing in the context of an increasing utilitarian culture . (Gouldner, 1970,
p. 492)
RESEARCH AS A CULTURAL IMPERATIVE REVISITED
At this point, one might argue that educational research contains many
different approaches and values to study . Within the educational research
community, for example, there are Marxists, pluralists, liberals, and so on .
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The conflict between people of different research orientations would tend to
cancel out the importance of any particular intellectual approach in
determining social affairs .
The history of science, however, suggests that not all approaches are
accepted equally . Marxist analysis, for example, while having a respected
tradition in Europe, has not been accepted within the American research
community. In contrast, behavioral and management approaches have
assumed a dominant position in this country's social scientific community .'
This dominance makes the pattern of power and authority underlying
behavioralism more potent in determining social affairs . Behavioralism is
used to sustain and make credible many existing practices . The fact that the
values of behavioralism are tacit and not scrutinized makes those values
psychologically compelling .
It is important to ask why a particular approach, such as behavioral
research, can become dominant . The answer, though, cannot be obtained
simply by examining the ideas generated by the approach itself . The
conclusions of behavioral education research, for example, often have little
practical use as metaphors or as predictors in institutional life . The reasons
for accepting a research pattern lie, in part, outside the educational
community and within larger historical and political trends .
The acceptance of behavioral research can be related to the rise of profes-
sionalism . The drive for professional stature of the managerial and the
"helping" occupations occurred at approximately the same historical time .
Each sought more control over its domains (Lasch, 1977) . The helping
professions, in particular, persuaded their clients to rely on scientific
technology and the advice of scientifically trained experts . The clients'
"needs," however, were not those which emerged from the clients, but were
often invented by professionals in order to create a demand for their
services. The "helping" professionals accepted a technological knowledge
which could be centralized and than parceled out in a piecemeal fashion .
Professionalism tends to undermine individuals' capacity to provide for
themselves and, thereby, justifies the continuing expansion and control of
experts into new sectors of society . The values of behavioralism can be
viewed as instrumental to this process .
Defining behavioralism as a research approach which influences and is
influenced by larger social patterns suggests that a major obligation of
researchers is to maintain a critical stance . Whether doing behavioral or
other modes of study, such as ethnography or phenomenology, researchers
must consider the impact of work beyond its immediate procedures or
findings . They must scrutinize the interests, visions, and definitions of
power made reasonable by the research approach . Their understanding
must include an overview of larger social and political processes and of how
they impinge upon research practices .
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CONCLUSIONS
Educational research involves values which emerge from an interplay of
various communities . Research into school affairs is influenced by a
community of scholars who follow accepted lines of reasoning, standards of
discourse and definitions of problems . The character of research is also
responsive to the issues and dilemmas confronted by the larger society .
Research is often initiated to resolve possible institutional contradictions .
The study of poverty, deviance, moral development or sexism are examples
of such responses to conflict .
The values affirmed in research are political. Theories and methods imply
what the customary ways of behaving in society are . Certain ways of
participating in social affairs are given emphasis and, hence, preference
through research activities . Rather than being aloof and detached,
engagement in research affirms social values, beliefs and hopes .
The values of educational research also have ideological implications . As
argued earlier, the perspectives of social science not only describe but also
give direction to how social events are to be challenged . The perspectives of
research are increasingly incorporated into common sense reasoning . The
theories of social and educational research help to define political, social
and educational problems. The methods of inquiry identify possible
solutions . These practices tend to favor certain interests and handicap
others in society through the underlying social visions and definitions of
power contained in research .
The normative quality of educational research makes it especially potent
when applied in schools because it imposes ideas and work patterns upon
children. Much of what occurs in schools is justified and made credible by
the activities of the educational research community . Scientific evidence
provides the rationale for curriculum development, instructional
approaches and evaluation strategies . Theories about social affairs,
childhood and learning guide educators in their choice of content and in the
procedures they use to conduct everyday activities at school .
Values in educational inquiry, therefore, pose certain responsibilities for
educators when developing and evaluating school programs . First, a self-
reflective and critical stance needs to be adopted by educational researchers .
The theories and procedures used to study social education programs and to
devise curriculum are not neutral . Educators need to consider the social and
political implications of educational analysis . It is worth noting that the
traditions of objectivity, detachment and scientific neutrality have
undergone a thorough reexamination and redefinition within the
philosophies of science. However, little of this discussion seems to have
filtered into everyday educational discourse .
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Second, educators should extend their notion of "adequacy" in research .
In part, acceptable research must conform to scientific procedures for
ensuring validity and reliability . These procedures, however, should include
careful deliberation about the ethical premises and moral considerations
upon which schools are founded . The potential of educational inquiry, I
believe, is in its ability to sustain a public discourse about how schools can
contribute to a more just and humane society .
Educational inquiry should provide a mode of analysis that can
illuminate the unintended and latent consequences of our school
arrangements . The ceremonies and rituals of our public institutions create
symbolic forms which make ongoing practices seem heroic, institutional
structures seem benevolent, and professionals seem competent in
maintaining the historic mission of schools . Yet social affairs are filled with
pretentions, deceptions and self-deceptions by which people cloak
the meanings and consequences of their arrangements with each other . Our
institutional arrangements have become traditional, customary and
seemingly "natural ." The unmasking and debunking motif in social inquiry
can be a powerful intellectual force in a social world that is built upon
beliefs in certainty (see, e.g ., Berger and Luchmann, 1967) .
Third, we should reconsider the way in which we proceed when designing
curriculum. Many educators consider the idea of scientific method as a
superior one in curriculum construction . Our analysis suggests that there is
no one scientific method, but rather there are scientific methods that
people invent to respond to problems in their social world . Inventions of
methods have the characteristic of reflecting different concepts of social
order and of disciplined thought . While I have discussed some of the
implications of the social nature of knowledge when applied to the problem
of social studies curriculum design elsewhere (Popkewitz, 1974, 1976,
1977), I would suggest here that to define inquiry as a logical or psycho-
logical task (such as analyzing, inferring, or interviewing) is to distort the
nature and character of that enterprise as a social endeavor . Logical or
solely psychological definitions hide the values and beliefs underlying the
forms of content brought into schools and the role of discourse in giving
shape to our conceptions of "self" and society .
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FOOTNOTES
'I will use the label "social science" as a general term which includes the
traditional social sciences (political science, sociology, psychology, and
history). Educational research is a special type of social science, having an
institutional focus on schooling . The generic label, social science, gives
emphasis to the social nature of all of the disciplines .
2 I have' explored the social and cultural nature of inquiry in "Myths of
Social Science in Curriculum" (Popkewitz, 1976a) and "Craft and
Community as Metaphors for Social Inquiry Curriculum" (Popkewitz,
1977) .
'Many of the theoretical perspectives and research techniques developed
at this historical time have become important to educational analysis .
Among these are the theory of functionalism in sociology and the . survey
methodology of behavioral science .
'These assumptions are challengeable . The discipline-centered curriculum
tends to provide a crystallized notion of "science" which distorts its
creativity and maintains values which are conservative (Keddie, 1971 ;
Popkewitz, 1976) .
'While the vision of open education does have the potential to guide
people in a search for social alternatives, the practice of open education has
tended to be nonpolitical. Puppetry, "creative" writing, or stitchery often
replace sustained disciplined thought . Mutual satisfaction among class
participants becomes the purpose of schooling rather than a search for
community in relation to some general intellectual problem or social issue .
6The idea, of objectivity in research can be treated in a different manner .
Berger and Luchmann (1967) define reality as being socially constructed
and maintained through a dialectic, thus arguing against a crystallization of
social structures .
7The assumptions, implications, and consequences of management
perspectives in education are discussed in Popkewitz and Wehlage (1973) .
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SOCIAL STUDIES AND CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION :
ELEMENTS OF A CHANGING RELATIONSHIP*
Richard C. Remy
Mershon Center
Ohio State University
How social studies educators define the scope of their interests in citizen-
ship education affects the way they organize themselves to work on citizen-
ship education as classroom instructors, curriculum developers, researchers
and managers of professional development activities . This paper considers
what currently is and what might be the relationship between the field of
social studies and citizenship education .
The paper is divided into three parts . The first part summarizes how we
have traditionally defined the scope and domain of our interest in citizen-
ship education . The second part evaluates this definition in light of social
science based knowledge about the process of citizenship education today .
The final section considers the implications for research, development and
teaching of broadening the definition of the field's interest in citizenship
education to encompass more than schools and schooling .
THE PRESENT RELATIONSHIP TO CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION
How have social studies educators traditionally defined the nature and
scope of their interest in the process of citizenship education? What facets
of this process have been of special concern to social studies educators?
What kinds of research, development and teaching activities related to
citizenship education do we currently undertake?
A majority of social studies educators today would likely agree that the
primary concern of social studies is citizenship education . This is evidenced
in several ways . Leaders within the field have pointed to citizenship
education as the "centering concept" of social studies (Shaver, 1977a, p .
115). A review of the evolution of the field recently concluded that, "there
is now general agreement that the primary, overriding purpose of the social
studies is citizenship education" (Barr, Barth and Shermis, 1977, p . 67-68) .
In addition, the Board of Directors of the National Council for the Social
Studies has called for social studies to be defined and presented in terms of
*The author wishes to thank John Patrick, Indiana University, and
Richard C. Snyder, Mershon Center, for their comments on an earlier
version of this paper .
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citizenship education, and for special efforts to be made by the Council to
improve citizenship education (Claugus, 1975; NCSS, 1976) . Finally, even
cursory examination of social studies instructional materials and curriculum
guidelines indicates that almost without exception they find their ultimate
justification in the development of competent citizens committed to
democratic values .
As things stand, social studies education equates citizenship education
with schools and schooling . That is, the formal and informal educational
processes related to citizenship development that occur in elementary and
high schools are the focal point of the field's concern . Within schools the
"social studies curriculum"-a particular sequence of courses and subject
matter from kindergarten through high school-is the prime interest of
most social studies educators .
Over the years this definition has come to set the boundaries for what is
considered legitimate or normal professional activities within the social
studies field . Of course, as is the case with any field, there is considerable
debate about specific problems, concepts and methodologies within the
prevailing definition of the field . For example, Barr, Barth and Sbermis
(1977, Chapter 4) describe three competing traditions within social studies
each designed to promote good citizenship education .' However, the
boundaries of the field of social studies itself are hardly ever questioned .
Rather, all the major intellectual and professional activties of the field are
defined in reference to elementary and high schools . Let us briefly consider
these activities .
CURRICULUM DEVELOPMENT
Social studies educators develop new instructional materials for use in
schools . They design and outline school curriculum patterns in the social
studies area. And they theorize about the structure of the curriculum and
about alternative instructional approaches . Over the years social studies
educators have advanced a variety of philosophical positions regarding the
curriculum and they have created a truly rich array of materials for use by
teachers and students in elementary and high schools (Patrick, 1977) . Little
or no attention, however, has been given to the development of educational
programs or activities outside of the schools .
TEACHING
Social studies educators train teachers and school administrators to
implement the K-12 social studies curriculum . This training occurs within a
framework of local and state certification requirements for educational
personnel . Social studies educators also train graduate students to be like
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themselves and carry on the field . A host of professional activities are
associated with the teaching function including the design of pre- and in-
service workshops, participation in the establishment of certification
requirements, the preparation of teaching methods, textbooks and the like .
Little or no attention, however, has been given to the preparation of people
for other educational roles in society related to citizenship education .
RESEARCH
Social studies educators conduct research on the effectiveness of their
development and teaching activities, on conditions relating to the process of
citizenship education in schools and on the diffusion of innovations within
schools (Hunkins et al ., 1977) . This comprehensive review of recent
research in the field equates social studies education with schooling and
identifies "the school as the most important locale for educational
research" in the future (p . 198) . Little or no attention, however, has been
given to analyzing the complex interactions of school and non-school agents
in the process of citizen development .
To summarize: As social studies educators we have directed our
professional activities to the various processes associated with citizenship
education in elementary and high schools . This reflects our definition of the
nature and scope of our interest in citizenship education .
AN EVALUATION OF THE CURRENT DEFINITION
How adequate is this way of defining the scope and domain of social
studies education as a professional field? Do present curriculum
development, teaching and research activities adequately reflect or take into
account what is known about citizenship education today?
In light of social science research on political learning (Dawson, Prewitt
and Dawson, 1977 ; Renshon, 1977), there would appear to be several
problems with the way social studies educators have come to define the
scope and domain of their interest in citizenship education . These are :
1 . Citizenship education is often not treated as a society-wide process
involving many social institutions .
2 . Limitations on the school's capacity to contribute to citizenship
education may not be adequately accounted for .
3 . Citizen competence with problem-solving in the social process is
frequently neglected .
4. Citizenship education is not treated as a cumulative, life-long process .
5 . The multi-method requirements of citizenship education are not fully
accounted for .
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CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION IS NOT TREATED AS A SOCIETY-
WIDE PROCESS INVOLVING MANY SOCIAL INSTITUTIONS
Who is involved in citizenship education? The traditional focus in the
social studies field has been on K-12 schools and schooling . Yet the
processes of political socialization and citizenship education are not
confined to elementary and high schools. Rather, these processes are
embedded in a rich institutional context that involves other major social
institutions in one way or another .
In addition to the schools, at least seven other non-school shaping forces
and arenas share in the process of political socialization and citizenship
education . These are governmental institutions, business and labor, the
mass-media, voluntary organizations, religious organizations and primary
groups, i.e., the family and peer groups . 2 These shaping forces perform
several functions in the process of citizen development which involve both
formal education and informal learning in institutional and non-institution-
al settings . We will not develop these distinctions here . Rather it is sufficient
to note that these sectors act as settings, where individuals confront daily
the tasks of citizenship, and as sources of the knowledge, skills, attitudes
and experiences we acquire through citizenship education. Each is a
stakeholder in the process in the sense that they have something to gain or
lose from the outcomes -of citizenship education . Taken together, these
sectors, along with the schools, represent the institutional ecology 'of citizen
development today .
The current focus on K-12 schools and schooling within the social studies
field isolates the field from many of the key participants in the development
of citizen competence . Such isolation has potentially negative consequences
for non-school agents of citizenship education, for the schools and for the
field of social studies education . For example, non-school agents such as
voluntary organizations are deprived of - the knowledge, materials and
educational expertise available in social studies education today . At the
same time isolation from other sectors limits the school's ability to
understand the non-school factors affecting school-based learning . Further,
it restricts the capacity of social studies educators to better coordinate their
work in the schools with non-school efforts in citizenship education .
Finally, isolation from non-school citizenship education substantially
reduces the capacity of the field to produce new knowledge about a very
significant dimension of the process through which people develop as
citizens . In turn, lack of knowledge regarding non-school citizenship
education restricts the field's capacity to develop innovative educational
programs that build upon the natural interaction between classroom,
school, home -and community .
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LIMITATIONS ON THE SCHOOLS' CAPACITY TO
CONTRIBUTE TO CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION MAY
NOT BE ADEQUATELY ACCOUNTED FOR
Schools have long occupied a prominent role in citizenship education and
they will probably continue to do so. However, the capacity of the schools
to contribute to citizenship education is limited in at least two ways . First,
there is a finite amount of curriculum space available for citizenship
education and the ability of the schools to integrate various curriculum
offerings is limited . Second, schools may be more appropriate for some
types of learning and instructing than for others .
Equating an interest in citizenship education with K-12 schooling has
greatly hindered the ability of social studies education to come to terms with
the limitations of the schools . Over the years as the complexity of citizen-
ship has increased social studies educators have developed a great variety of
new approaches to citizenship education . These include global education,
moral education, law-related education, multi-cultural education, career
education, consumer education, environmental education, values
education, community involvement, psychology, sociology and economics .
Many of the ideas in these new approaches are intrinsically valuable .
However, total preoccupation with formal schooling has meant that social
studies educators have attempted to load all new contributions to
citizenship education on the schools whether they really belonged there or
not. Thus, most of these contributions are structured as discrete entities
aimed at specific niches in the elementary or high school curriculum much
like ice-cubes in a tray. Curriculum "change" comes about when one cube
is removed to be replaced by another .
Because of the already crowded school agenda the new contributions to
citizenship education must compete with each other and with the more
traditional history, geography and government for a share of the social
studies curriculum "turf." This creates an either/or situation . Either there
is room for consumer or global education, for instance, in the curriculum or
there is room for one or more of their "competitors," but there is not room
for all .
The result is that given the current structure of American schools-a
structure not likely to change-it is almost impossible to integrate all these
discrete new contributions into the curriculum and hence into the citizen's
education . Thus, there is a risk that the citizen's education is being
continually fragmented into smaller and more specialized segments that
bear little relationship to the actual tasks of citizenship people must cope
with in everyday life .
In addition, a focus on schooling has meant that as new contributions to
citizenship education are developed, social studies educators rarely question
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whether the schools are the most appropriate institutional vehicle for these
contributions . Yet socialization research indicates that the different agents
of citizenship education vary in their appropriateness for teaching
particular kinds of knowledge, skills and attitudes or for providing
participation experiences (Weissberg, 1974, pp . 140;50). Schools, for
instance, may be a more efficient vehicle for teaching facts about
constitutional processes than families and peer groups. In contrast, families
and peer groups • are likely to be strong forces in shaping basic identities and
values. Further, the sectors vary in their susceptibility to planned
interventions in the process of citizenship education . For example, it may be
more difficult to diffuse an educational innovation among millions of
elementary school teachers than among a small number of labor union
officials. Unfortunately, our preoccupation with the schools in citizenship
education has prevented us from thinking systematically about the strengths
and weaknesses of the schools as compared to the other agents of
citizenship education .
CITIZEN COMPETENCE WITH PROBLEM-SOLVING IN THE
SOCIAL PROCESS IS FREQUENTLY NEGLECTED
Citizen competence is a multi-dimensional concept . One dimension
involves solving problems, making plans, . taking action 'in the social
process. This dimension of citizen competence is concerned with actually
impacting or influencing specific social or political problems affecting
oneself. It includes reflection and understanding but it also involves active
behavior in the sense of attempts to manipulate phenomena in the
environment external to oneself. 3 It is not the only dimension- of citizen
competence but it is an important one.
The goal of advancing this aspect of citizen competence, like other goals
in citizenship education, involves - teaching varying combinations of
knowledge, skills, attitudes and participation experiences . But it is distinct
in its concern for ordering these attributes in ways relevant to a specific
issue or problem confronting a group of citizens . For example, a social
studies unit on the problems of bureaucracy using case studies of welfare
agencies is not designed to promote problem-solving in the sense meant
here. And it may or may not actually enhance students' ability to influence
a welfare agency if they have to . On the other hand, an educational
program designed to teach welfare recipients how to secure benefits from
their state welfare agency is designed to promote their problem-solving
competence in the social process .
By limiting the scope of the field's interest to the schools, we have greatly
restricted our capacity to pursue this goal in citizenship education . For it
can be argued that schools are not necessarily the best place to teach people
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how to try to influence or in some way impact specific problems they
confront . Schools are spatially and temporarily removed from those
institutional sectors in the social process where such problems are often
encountered. Further, it is impossible for school-based educators to predict
accurately the specific problems or issues students will face in the future .
Also, time spent on this goal would be time taken away from pursuing other
important objectives in citizenship education more amenable to the schools'
particular capabilities and responsibilities . Finally, pursuit of this objective
could be politically risky for schools and could bring them into conflict with
the community .
CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION IS OFTEN NOT TREATED
AS A CUMULATIVE LIFELONG PROCESS
The learning that results from citizenship education begins early in life
and continues throughout life . This learning is cumulative in the sense that
it builds on itself to produce at any point in time, the individual's particular
level of citizenship competence. Thus, what a person learns about the social
world at one age is influenced by what they have learned previously . For
instance, what youngsters learn about elections at age fifteen is grounded in
and shaped by what was learned at age twelve . In turn, learning at age
twelve is conditioned by earlier learning . This process does not end with
high school or college graduation but continues throughout our adult life
(Rosenau, 1977 ; Cutler, 1977) .
We learn different things at different phases in the continual process of
citizenship education. Because of evolving cognitive/intellectual capacities
and opportunities for learning, certain times in our lives will be more
suitable to learning particular knowledge, skills and attitudes than other
times. For example, early childhood is a time when we acquire basic
political attachments and identifications . Late adolescence and adulthood,
on the other hand, are times when we are more likely to learn about specific
issues and actions associated with day-to-day political conflict as well as
times to sharpen political skills and motivation (Weissberg, 1974) .
Thus, citizenship education does not stop at grade twelve but occurs
throughout life . Many of the non-school agents of citizenship education are
concerned with adult education in one form or another . The field's current
focus on elementary and high schools does not seem to recognize adequately
the life-long nature of citizen development. As a result, it cuts social studies
educators off from an important slice of the citizenship education process .
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THE MULTI-METHOD REQUIREMENTS OF CITIZENSHIP
EDUCATION ARE NOT FULLY ACCOUNTED FOR
Citizenship education involves more than social studies courses in school
combined with patriotic rituals and rhetoric . Research on political social-
ization and human development clearly indicate that citizenship education
involves complex processes of human learning and development . These
processes include the cognitive, the moral, the social and the emotional
growth of people .
Thus different kinds of learning are involved in the process of citizen
development . Instructional theorists have hypothesized that different types
of learning require different instructional procedures (Ehman, Mehlinger
and Patrick, 1974, pp. 118-29). The field's current focus on schooling
unnecessarily restricts the capacity of social studies educators to pursue a
multi-method approach to citizenship education . A focus on schooling
automatically places psychological and social restraints on the variety of
instructional approaches educators can use to promote citizen competence .
For example, the very real institutional constraints involved in designing
K-12 curriculum that requires field-trips or out-of-school activities are
well-known to curriculum developers .
Such restraints do not completely prohibit the use of instructional variety
in classroom settings as the use of role-playing, simulations, inquiry
techniques and the like demonstrate . But the restraints associated with
working with children and adolescents in the institutional setting of the
school can inhibit social studies educators from experimenting with the full
range of methods and instructional theories available to them . Further,
such restraints can prevent experimentation with time-honored instructional
approaches in new learning settings . As a result, it inhibits the field's
capacity to improve and refine these approaches .
IMPLICATIONS OF REDEFINING THE SCOPE OF THE
FIELD'S INTEREST IN CITIZENSHIP EDUCATION
To this point we have seen that :
1 . Social studies educators have proclaimed citizenship education as a
primary concern of their field . At the same time we have defined our
interest in citizenship education narrowly in terms of K-12 schools and
schooling . This is evidenced by our research, teaching and curriculum
development activities .
2. Social science research indicates that the process of political develop-
ment is impacted not only by schools but by other forces in -society
such as primary groups, the mass media and voluntary organizations .
Further, these non-school actors have a stake in citizenship education
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and many conduct their own citizenship-related instructional
programs .
3. Given the society-wide nature of citizen development the focus of
social educators on citizenship education in the schools displays
several weaknesses . As a result, this narrow definition of the field's
interest in citizenship education may unnecessarily limit the capacity
of the field to achieve its proclaimed goal of improving citizenship
education .
A conclusion which flows naturally from this type of analysis is that there
is a need, or at least a real opportunity, for social studies educators to
broaden and redefine the scope of their interests in citizenship education .
Such a redefinition might be stated as follows : Social studies education has
an interest in educating citizens of all ages by undertaking educational
activities in each of the sectors involved in citizenship education today .
These sectors could be taken to include not only schools but also local, state
and national government, business and labor, the mass media, primary
groups, voluntary organizations, and religious organizations . Social studies
educators could have "clients" and on-going research, development and
teaching programs related to these settings just as they currently work with
teachers, students, school administrators, and others associated with the
educational institutions of our society .
Social studies educators, for example, could work with a labor union to
develop an instructional program for its members on the impact of federal
energy programs on job security . Or they might work with a YMCA in
developing a new citizenship education program focused on decision-
making skills in everyday life . Or they might help a community organization
prepare a series of consumer education programs for its member . Yet other
social studies educators could develop a special interest in working with a
municipal court to design instructional programs for citizens who find
themselves embroiled with the legal system for one reason or another .
Redefining the scope of the field's interest in citizenship education along
such lines would not change the overarching purpose of social studies
education-the development of competent citizens . In fact, it would be
quite consistent with recent efforts to define the social studies as "an
integration of experience and knowledge concerning human relations for
the purpose of citizenship education" (Barr, Barth and Shermis, 1977, p .
69). Nor would such redefinition mean that social studies educators would
any longer be concerned with the curriculum in schools, teacher education
or the social organization and culture of schools . Most social studies
educators would be likely to continue to pursue the field's time-honored
concerns in these areas . But an expanded interest in citizenship education
beyond school settings would draw attention in the field to the total
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institutional ecology of citizenship education and might more adequately
recognize the continuing, life-long nature of the process of citizen
development .
A small number of commentators have expressed the need for
redefinition along such lines. James Shaver, for example, has noted the
need not only for "adequate citizenship education programs [to] go beyond
the school into the community," but to "go ever further . . . and extend our
educational influence beyond the teacher-directed and supervised situation
. . . to make parents (and by extension, labor unions, civic clubs, and so on)
active, effective parts of the citizenship education process ." Shaver goes on
to suggest, "It is time to ask how to utilize the home and other social
settings for citizenship education . How can we extend our curriculum
development and instructional competencies to non-school settings?"
(Shaver, 1977b, p . 304) .
This, of course, is a critical question . Yet, despite the growing sense
among many social studies educators of the need for redefining the field's
interest in citizenship education, little systematic consideration has been
given to the implications of such a redefinition for research, development
and teaching activities in the field. What new professional activities are
implied by expanding the field's concern with citizenship education to
non-school settings? And what conditions must be met if social studies
educators are to contribute to and benefit from non-school based
citizenship education? The remainder of this paper will be devoted to a
consideration of these two questions .
NEW PROFESSIONAL ACTIVITIES
Reconceptualizing the field's interest in citizenship education would
imply several fresh dimensions of development, teaching and research roles
for the field . Specifically, new professional activities likely to be associated
with a redefined social studies education include :
1. The development of educational programs for individuals and organ-
izations in non-school sectors of society .
2 . The development of university-based adult education programs to
build citizenship competence .
3 . The training of personnel involved in non-school citizenship education
activities.
4. Research on citizenship education in non-school settings .
5. Coordination and monitoring of citizenship education efforts
involving different sectors of society.
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Let us consider each category of activities in more detail .
1 . The development of educational programs for individuals and organ-
izations in non-school sectors of society .
A redefinition of the field's interest in citizenship education would very
likely involve social studies educators in curriculum development activities
related to the governmental, family, business and labor, mass-media,
voluntary and religious sectors of society . The scope of the field's
involvement might range from part-time assistance in planning and
conceptualizing programs to the actual development of new instructional
programs, projects and activities . For example, a social studies faculty
might occasionally consult with a local government wishing to develop
educational programs about municipal services for city residents . On the
other hand, a faculty group might design and develop a complete program
about the structure of state government for a veterans organization that
annually sponsors a workshop on the topic for high school students .
The goals or purposes of such curriculum development activities would
probably vary and depend on the needs of the "clients" involved . But the
content of these activities would likely be of two types . The first would be
content related to a particular organization or institutional sector itself . For
example, educational programs describing the services offered by organi-
zations like the League of Women Voters might be developed for such
organizations. Or a program for senior citizens might explain how to effici-
ently use the Medicare system . Or educational activities might be developed
for community organizations like the National Neighborhood Training
Institute. The Institute offers courses designed to enhance the skills of
neighborhood leaders, organizers, clinic and service workers who want to
be effective in neighborhood organizations (Mehlinger and Patrick, 1977,
p. 30) .
The second type of content would not focus on a particular organization
itself, but deal instead with topics pertinent to a variety of objectives in civic
education . An example might be a knowledge building program like one
sponsored by the Dow Chemical Company . The Dow program describes for
its workers the functions of the Federal government, the Congress and
regulatory agencies . The program seeks to explain how politics work and
how citizens can exert influence if they become active (Mehlinger and
Patrick, 1977, p. 16). Or social studies educators might assist a local
newspaper in developing a special supplement aimed at increasing readers'
skills in using the paper as a source of information about community
affairs .
As these examples indicate, instructional materials development of this
sort could have adults and/or youth as its intended audience . Such curricula
might be developed at a university or college site but it would almost always
be implemented in non-university, non-school settings .
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2. The development of university-based adult education programs to
build citizen competence.
Redefinition of the field's interest would also be likely to involve some of
us in the creation of adult education courses . Such programs could aim at
building citizen competence with "generic" skills such as decision-making
(e.g ., decision skills for daily living) . Or they could promote "environmen-
tal problem-solving" competence with regard to locally relevant issues, e.g .,
how to plan for and secure better youth recreation opportunities in the
community .
Adult education programs could be offered with or without credit at
colleges and universities . They might take an entire semester or meet only
two or three times . They could aim at special audiences such as youth
workers, juvenile officers and social service workers or at the general
public. They might be designed and presented alone or in combination with
other academics within the university such as sociologists concerned with
juvenile crime . Or they might be undertaken in conjunction with an organ-
ization within the community such as a unit of local government, a
voluntary organization, a corporation or a labor union .
The challenge would be to design popular and practical programs with
sound conceptual underpinnings. Programs which met real needs in an
interesting way would be successful, others would not. A string of
successful programs would likely generate demands for additional activity
of this kind . In addition, success would help social studies educators make
contact with sectors of the community beyond the schools .
3. The training ofpersonnel involved in non-school citizenship education
activities.
Teacher education has long been a central concern of social studies
education. Broadening the field's concerns to include non-school citizen-
ship education is likely to involve social studies educators in the training of
individuals in non-school organizations engaged in citizenship education
efforts . . Such training might take several forms .
One such form would be to train individuals to use and evaluate
educational programs designed for their organization by social studies
educators . For example, Sunday school teachers might have to be trained to
implement a moral reasoning skills program developed for their church by
social studies educators . This function would be similar to training teachers
and school administrators to install and use a curriculum innovation .
A second activity would be to train individuals from non-school organ-
izations to develop and evaluate their own citizenship education programs .
For example, labor union staff members specializing in educational tasks
might receive training on how to develop new skill-building programs . Such
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training might be "pre- or in-service." That is, it could occur "on the job"
or in undergraduate, graduate or continuing education courses within the
university .
A third activity could be to increase non-school civic educators'
knowledge of the field of citizenship education . This could include
awareness of key issues and alternative approaches to citizenship education
as well as knowledge of available school and non-school educational
materials. For example, staff members of community organizations around
the country might attend a workshop designed to acquaint them with
school-based citizenship programs that involve students in local community
activities . Or military personnel responsible for political education
programs in the armed services might participate in programs designed to
inform them of the citizenship training new recruits had received in
elementary and high school .
4. Research on citizenship education in non-school settings .
The process of citizenship education in non-school settings has not been
adequately investigated by social studies educators . Expanding the scope of
our interest in citizenship education should prompt researchers to take a
more active interest in this area . Significant, long-term improvements in
citizenship education ultimately depend upon expanding research efforts to
the total process of citizenship education, not just that segment occurring in
the schools .
Research opportunities in this domain are so numerous that we will
simply suggest some obviously important categories of needed research .
First, there is a pressing need for contextual mapping across the
governmental, family, business and labor, mass-media, voluntary and
religious sectors . We need descriptive studies which identify on-going
activities, programs and projects in each of these non-school sectors . This
mapping should systematically develop information regarding such
questions as: Who is undertaking citizenship education efforts in
non-school sectors? What is their intended audience? What are their goals?
What resources do they have at their command? What educational
strategies do they employ to achieve their goals? Second, there is a need for
research which systematically evaluates the effectiveness of such programs .
What factors appear to be associated with success or failure in this area?
Third, there is a need to assess the relationship, if any, between efforts in
school and non-school settings . What interactive effects are there? Do
citizenship education efforts in different sectors reinforce or contradict each
other? Is coordination among educational activities in different sectors
possible or desirable?
Fourth, new research should aim at developing empirically grounded
typologies of which sectors are the best carriers of which particular
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intervention in citizenship education at what point in the individual's
development. If research indicates that it is likely we learn different things
at different points in our lifecycles as citizens, one important question
becomes which sectors of society are most appropriate for teaching which
kinds of knowledge, skills and attitudes associated with citizenship
education .
These categories of needed research are not exhaustive but merely
suggestive . A rich and important array of . research topics awaits social
studies educators who define their research interests in terms of the total
process of citizenship education .
5 . Coordination and monitoring of citizenship education efforts involv-
ing different sectors of society .
Fragmentation and duplication characterize citizenship education today .
A lack of coordination and communication is apparent among the array of
organizations, projects and individuals interested in citizenship education .
Promising efforts are seldom linked to or aware .of other similar or
complementary programs . As a result opportunities to effect constructive
change in citizenship education are often lost, and potential and existing
resources frequentlyy remain undeveloped .
School-based citizenship education in particular has suffered from this
situation. The fragmentation of the learning process coupled with the
discipline's lack of knowledge .about citizenship education efforts outside of
schools has made it difficult to link school-based programs to learning
activities in other sectors of society .
Redefining the field's interest in citizenship education broadly would
surely involve some social studies educators in the coordination of school
and non-school educational programs . As experts in school-based citizen-
ship education with a legitimate access to the schools, they could design
programs which coordinate more effectively learning activities involving the
schools with other sectors of society .
Further, some social studies educators might , periodically monitor
changes in , the patterns of citizenship . education across different
institutional sectors . This would permit the design of alternative futures in
citizenship education capable of anticipating demographic, social, cultural
and technological changes . In addition, it would help the field of social
studies education function as a communication system for cross-sector and
cross-program learning .
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REQUIREMENTS FOR EXPANDING THE FIELD'S INVOLVEMENT
What would be required if social studies education were to successfully
expand its involvement in citizenship education? At a minimum four
conditions would probably have to be met for the field to contribute to and
benefit from non-school based citizenship education . These are the
development of a support system within the field for this kind of activity,
the identification of others engaged in civic education, the development of
norms and techniques for working with others outside the field and the
schools, and empirically based conceptualization .
A SUPPORT SYSTEM
At a minimum the task of expanding the field's involvement in citizen-
ship education must be seen as a legitimate professional enterprise . That is,
it must be seen as an intellectually acceptable and worthwhile enterprise by
leaders and trendsetters within social studies education. This will occur
when such individuals see expanded involvement as beneficial to their own
and the field's self-interest and as within their capability .
From this basic acceptance an institutional, intellectual and cultural
support system for expanded involvement can develop over time within
social studies education . Such a system would likely have two key elements .
The first would be the emergence of a sub-culture within the field interested
in non-school citizenship education problems . This would be a group of
scholars with shared identity and concerns in the same sense that we now
speak of a sub-culture of social science or values educators within the field .
The second element would be a cluster of social studies departments with an
interest and organizational commitment to non-school citizenship
education .
The emergence of a sub-culture would further enhance the legitimacy of
the enterprise and it would provide an array of models for others to
emulate. Additionally, it would help "breed" graduate students with
similar interests and yield an expanding pool of instructional materials,
dissertations, publications and other artifacts associated with success in the
field .
IDENTIFYING OTHERS
By definition social studies educators cannot expand the field's
involvement in citizenship education alone . They must locate others already
engaged or interested in civic education efforts . The challenge would seem
to be to develop over time the capacity to identify who is doing what, where,
how, when and why . Such continual monitoring would yield opportunities
for the kinds of professional activities described above .
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While this need may seem obvious, how to fulfill it is not. The world
beyond schools is largely alien territory for social studies education . If we
seek to locate others by simply looking for replications of school-based
social ' studies in non-school settings, we are bound to be disappointed .
Instead, we would have to recognize that educational activities in
non-school settings may take many forms, some quite different from what
we automatically associate with citizenship education. In addition, we
would need to be alert to opportunities arising from activities with second-
and third-order effects . That is, non-school activities whose manifest goal
may be something other than citizenship education, but which also have
latent_ consequences for citizen education .
BUILDING COLLABORATIVE RELATIONSHIPS
Expanding the field's involvement in citizenship education will also
require building relations with others engaged in educating citizens . This
would be a critical challenge if social studies education were to expand its
involvement in citizenship education .
Social studies educators know how to collaborate with individuals and
organizations within the educational sector of society . There are established
and time-honored norms, procedures and roles to guide interaction with the
world of elementary and secondary schools . In addition, a good deal of this
interaction is structured by legal requirements in the form of teacher
certification laws, state-mandated curriculum outlines, regional accredi-
tation requirements and the like .
There are no such formal or informal guidelines for helping us interact
effectively with those engaged in non-school citizenship education . What
models, for example, might guide the efforts of social studies educators
working with a community group interested in a skill-building educational
program for neighborhood leaders? What might be a useful source of
norms, procedures and roles for guiding such a collaborative relationship?
The clinical approach suggests itself as a potentially useful model for
university-based social studies educators wishing to exand their profes-
sional activities into non-school "areas . This model is drawn from the
agricultural experiment station and from health clinics such as the Mayo
Clinic, the Menninger Clinic and university-related hospitals .' There are, as
yet, few distinct and absolute counterparts of these clinical approaches to
education .
In short, the clinical approach represents a particular way of configuring
university-based resources to respond to practical problems . In a clinical
relationship the clients (patients) and their problems determine how the
configuration of knowledge resources are arranged to help them. For
example, given a medical patient's symptoms, medical knowledge is
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reviewed to help physicians categorize the malady, thus focusing the
problem to be solved. After a diagnosis is confirmed, perhaps through
appropriate tests, the medical team can determine the type of treatment
required. Once administered, the treatment is evaluated for possible
modification .
Richard Snyder has identified four basic properties or distinguishing
characteristics of a clinical relationship . There are :
1 . A clinical relationship or process occurs in a special kind of dyadic
interaction deliberately created between two parties, one of whom is a
helper (a) and one of whom is a helpee (b) .
2 . The manifest purpose of the clinical dyad is a directed and marked
change in the present state of the helpee (party b)-a change from now
to later which is defined as some degree of betterment .
3 . The achievement of the basic purpose of the dyad invariably involves
(among other elements, of course) the application or transfer of
generalized or generalizable knowledge to a single instance (case) .
4. The "problem" addressed by the relationship is considered to be a
"live" problem, i.e ., to arise from and be embedded in some natural
settings, even though subsequently the problem is discovered not to be
"real" or is redefined . (Snyder, 1974, p . 5)
The clinical approach represents one model of how the profession might
structure collaborative relationships with others . There, of course, may be
several others . The clinical approach has the merit of involving individuals
and groups with educational problems as agenda-setting participants in the
process of citizenship education .
CONCEPTUALIZATION
Howard Mehlinger has noted that a "special weakness" in the field is
"the absence of powerful conceptualizations that link the various
contributors to citizen education and that respond to current social
concerns" (Mehlinger, 1976) . Successfully expanding the scope and domain
of the field's interest in citizenship education would require social studies
educators to work seriously on conceptual development . As things now
stand the field is certainly open to the criticism that it is a loose collectivity
of people doing a widely varying number of things under the symbol of
"citizenship ." Putting empirically based, systematized, generalizable
conceptual content into that symbol may be the highest order of business
for social studies educators today .
Such conceptualization would have to go beyond efforts to "define the
field" in terms of positions which are never operationalized or empirically
tested . In the same vein, the acceptance or rejection of conceptualizations
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should not- be based on personalities . Rather, serious - conceptualization
would require the operationalization of middle-range concepts and
hypotheses about citizenship in curriculum and research designs which can
be empirically verified or rejected .
This kind of theory-building does not seem like a task which can wait
while "we get on with the day-to-day business of social studies education ."
Indeed, it hardly seems responsible to continue indefinitely with
"traditions" or "factions" in the field which compete primarily on an
ideological, personality and/or political basis . Such laissez-faire pluralism
is only likely to perpetuate a situation akin to a group of doctors saying to a
sick patient-"We don't know what disease is but how can we help you?"
The development of clinical, helping relationships with others as well as
disciplined research and curriculum development will be greatly enhanced
by thorough and systematic conceptualization of the social, cultural and
political process of central concern to the field .
To summarize: The four conditions we have identified-legitimacy,
identification of opportunities, building relationships and conceptual-
ization-would seem to be necessary conditions for expanding the field's
interest in citizenship education . Yet, they may not be sufficient conditions
for such expansion . Successfully redefining the boundaries of the field is a
complicated process and many other factors could be involved . However, it
may be difficult to identify these factors until efforts to implement the
redefinition are actually undertaken and evaluated .
There is an opportunity for social studies educators to redefine the scope
of their interest in citizenship education. This would require the field to
move beyond a focus on schools and schooling to a concern with citizenship
education in all of the institutional sectors of our complex society .
Expanding the scope of the field's interest in the manner described here
would not be easy . There are no real precedents to follow and no
ready-made captive audiences such as are found in the schools . Yet, given
our analysis, expanding the field's interest would seem to deserve significant
consideration .
FOOTNOTES
'See also Brubaker, Simon and Williams (1977) . There would also seem
to be a reasonable consensus within the field that four attributes are
associated with citizenship education . These are knowledge, skills, attitudes
and participation experiences . These attributes have been described as
follows .
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1 . Knowledge about what is called in the liberal arts tradition, the
human condition, including knowledge about past, present and
future .
2. Skills necessary to process information .
3 . Development of values and beliefs .
4. Some way of applying what has been learned in active social partici-
pation. (Barr, Barth and Shermis, 1977, pp . 68-69)
'In human societies basic values such as enlightenment are shaped and
distributed by institutions . By non-school shaping forces I have in mind
both formal, complex organizations, and established and structured
patterns of behavior and relationships accepted as the way of doing things
in any culture. See Herman and Herman (1977) . The typology of sectors
used in the present paper is a first approximation and intended to be
illustrative rather than definitive .
'For a discussion of competence see Newmann (1975, Chapter 1) .
4Several Mershon Center documents describe the elements of a clinical
approach. See Muth and Slonaker (1976, Chapter 1) ; Gore, Redfield and
Bolland (1976) ; and Ripley (1977) .
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CURRICULUM DESIGN AS A POLITICAL ACT:
PROBLEMS AND CHOICES IN TEACHING SOCIAL JUSTICE*
Cleo H. Cherryholmes
Michigan State University
Social studies curriculum development is complex and demanding . Its
complexity arises from the need to balance a variety of competing tasks,
which include presenting information, processing values, developing skills,
building concepts and explanations, and forming attitudes and orientations .
It demands that the curriculum developer have a sufficiently wide range of
knowledge and skills to cope with these questions . The Tyler rationale
(1950) for curriculum development has been an important influence, if not
always an explicit guide, on those working on social studies curriculum in
the 1960's and 1970's. Tyler's four steps : (1) stating objectives, (2) selecting
experiences appropriate to the objectives, (3) ordering the experiences, and
(4) evaluating outcomes in terms of the objectives ; attempt to rationalize
curriculum development as a linear process. The Tyler formulation, if not
actually able to reduce the complexity and demands of social studies
curriculum development, at least seems to make the process more
manageable .
The Tyler model for curriculum and course development is linear . After
one states objectives it is possible to proceed to learning experiences, then to
evaluation and possibly to adjustments in the learning experiences . This
general procedure has been utilized in developing social studies materials
(Gillespie and Patrick, 1974) and in the analysis of social studies materials
(Morrissett, Stevens and Woodley, 1969) . But appropriate objectives are of
central importance if such a linear model is to work and considerable
progress has been made in the area of behavioral objectives since Tyler's
initial rationale (Mager, 1962 ; Popham, 1970 ; Davis, Alexander and Yelon,
1974). It is fair to say that the successful application of Tyler's approach
depends upon objectives; if objectives are not stated correctly or it it is not
possible to state objectives appropriately, then it follows that one cannot
proceed linearly through learning experiences to their evaluation .
*I would like to thank three anonymous reviewers for their comments,
Gary Manson, and especially Judy Gillespie . But, obviously, I accept final
responsibility for what follows .
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When clearly defined goals are lacking, it is impossible to evaluate .a
course or program efficiently, and there is no sound basis for selecting
appropriate materials, content, or instructional methods . (Mager,
1962, p . 3)
Of the two impediments to clearly stated objectives, their incorrect
statement or the impossibility of so stating them, curriculum specialists
have often denied the latter and turned their attention to the former .
Alexander, Davis and Yelon (1974) offer the following definition of a
learning objective :
A learning objective is a description of the behavior expected of a
learner after instruction . (p . 29)
A learning objective consists of three components : (1) terminal
behavior; (2) test conditions; and (3) standards .
Definition: Terminal behavior is the component of a learning
objective that describes the behavior of a student after instruction .
(p. 33)
If the success of a linear curriculum model depends upon useful learning
objectives, then it is also the case that useful learning objectives in turn
depend upon the specification of terminal behavior. If the curriculum
developer can state appropriate terminal behavior, then it is possible to
move through the other parts of the process in an orderly fashion .
This essay will question a basic assumption made by those who promote
the use of learning objectives, that it is always possible to state terminal
behavior; an extended counter-example, the teaching of social justice, will
be presented . We will begin by inquiring into certain logical properties
implied by the definition of a learning objective . Is terminal behavior a
necessary, a sufficient, or a necessary and sufficient. condition for the
attainment of a learning objective? But what are the formal properties of
each of these conditions? Formally, a necessary condition is that the result
will not occur if the condition is not fulfilled (Salmon, 1973, pp . 44-45) .
--p --)--q
Or, q "only if" p . In learning objective terminology, a student attains
objective q "only if" terminal behavior p is exhibited .
A sufficient condition is that the result will obtain "if" the condition
does .
poq
Or, "if" p, then q . The learning objective equivalent . i s "if" a student
performs terminal behavior p, then the objective, q, is achieved .
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A necessary and sufficient condition is the most restrictive .
(p -, q) • (q z, p)
Or, "if and only if" p, then q. Students would achieve the desired objective
"if and only if" a specified behavior were forthcoming .
Whether a terminal behavior is a necessary, sufficient, or necessary and
sufficient condition for attaining a learning objective might appear at first
glance to be a trivial question . A curriculum developer might respond that,
at a given time, one might write a terminal objective with any of these
properties. But this response does not withstand scrutiny because necessary
conditions can only refer to requisites of terminal objectives, to enabling
objectives, and not to terminal objectives themselves . Terminal behavior is
the end point of the learning or evaluation activity . A necessary condition
only indicates a required step along the way ; a sufficient condition indicates
that the final step has been reached . Necessary and sufficient conditions
also indicate the achievement of the learning objective but the "if and only
if" condition is very constraining . It would appear that only in special
situations, such as in highly technical applications, are necessary and
sufficient conditions useful .
Therefore, a linear model of curriculum development rests upon learning
objectives which are composed of terminal behaviors which are sufficient
conditions for attaining an objective . If terminal behaviors which are not
sufficient conditions for attaining learning objectives cannot be stated, then
a linear model of curriculum development cannot be employed . An
alternative model or reformulation of the linear model is required .
The remainder of this essay will show that it is not possible to state
terminal objectives that are sufficient conditions for certain kinds of
learning objectives . Specifically these are terminal learning objectives in the
area of social justice which makes substantive claims about just social
institutions. It will also be shown that a number of necessary conditions for
enabling objectives can be stated but that they do not collectively constitute
sufficient conditions for substantive terminal objectives about social
justice. Based on the extensive counter-example to be presented, the linear
model as an approach to curriculum development is found to be wanting
because sufficient conditions for attaining these substantive learning
objectives cannot in principle be stated. Following the discussion of social
justice an additional assumption, the Plurality/Emergence assumption will
be offered, which, when added to the more well known steps of linear
curriculum development models, relaxes the need that terminal objectives
be sufficient conditions. Curriculum implications of the Plurality/
Emergence assumption will be developed in terms of classroom discourse
and its evaluation . Finally, it will be suggested that at a meta-level
curriculum models should bear some rough correspondence to the subject
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matter being taught . It may be that different subject matters can
accommodate objectives which specify behaviors which are only necessary,
sufficient, or necessary and sufficient for attaining the objectives .
A final comment about behavioral objectives . They have sometimes been
criticized because they seem to "discourage students from expanding their
horizons by encouraging them to confine their learning to specified
objectives and as a result incidental learning is depressed", (Melton, . 1978, p .
291) . Part of this criticism may be due to the fact that curriculum developers
and course designers are only able to write terminal behaviors that are
necessary but not sufficient for-achieving more complex, sophisticated, or
judgmental learning objectives . If this were the case, the learning experience
would certainly be superficial and shallow when measured against the
subject matter being taught .
What began as a seemingly innocuous and possibly irrelevant query into
the logical relationship between a learning objective and its component
terminal .objective has uncovered the fact that terminal objectives must be
sufficient conditions for attaining the learning objective if a linear model of
curriculum development is to work . It will now be- shown that in the case of
social justice substantive terminal behaviors, which are sufficient conditions
for definitively determining the social justice of given social institutions and
processes, cannot be stated. In this instance, and possibly in others,
conventional, linear models of curriculum development are inadequate .
Social justice is a subject with a complex and ancient past in the history•of
ideas . Our purpose is not to outline or recount these historical meanings of
social justice or to provide an extensive explication of its contemporary
meanings. Nor will we consider views of social justice that derive from
various religions or from Marxian or neo-Marxian theorists, although an
analysis of such views of social justice would also be instructive for our
purposes . We will rather consider views of social justice represented in the
work of three men, each representing a different philosophical perspective :
John Harsanyi (1953, 1955, and 1974) on average utilitarianism, John
Rawls (1971) on a contemporary version of the social contract or contract-
arianism, and Robert Nozick (1974) on libertarianism . It is much more
manageable to outline positions and trace arguments in the work of an
individual than to characterize the work of an entire school, such as the neo-
Marxians .
JOHN HARSANYI ON UTILITARIANISM -
Historically utilitarianism has been associated with David Hume, - Adam
Smith, Jeremy Bentham, John 'Stuart Mill, John Austin, Henry Sidgwick,
and F.Y. Edgeworth. The most widely known statement associated with
utilitarianism is that society should be so arranged to provide "'the greatest
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happiness of the greatest number" (Urmson, 1978, p . 227). This phrasing
was apparently invented by Francis Hutcheson and used by Joseph Priestly
in whose work Bentham found it. The classical utilitarian approach was to
maximize the greatest good in a society . This would be achieved by
maximizing the absolute sum of expectations in a society . Since each
individual added to a society would also contribute to the total
expectations, the absolute sum of expectations for a society would increase
simply as a result of population growth, and even though the average
expectation for each individual in that society might become worse off! To
correct for this many including Harsanyi advocate average utilitarianism,
"every person making a moral value judgment will evaluate any
institutional arrangement in terms of the average utility it yields for the
individual members of society" (Harsanyi, 1974, p . 600) . How does an
individual go about making these judgments? Each individual has
subjective preferences or utility functions . These utility functions may be
different for each individual . One way to decide which social policy yields
the highest average utility for a society is to estimate to what extent a given
policy would satisfy the utility functions for all members of a society .
Individuals have utility functions which are their subjective preferences .
Individuals also have a social welfare function . Now a social welfare
function for an individual represents the utility functions for all individuals
in the society . Each of us, then, has subjective preferences and we also make
estimates of the subjective preferences of others . How does this work?
Harsanyi argues that we learn what to prefer . The learning process by
which our utility functions are formed is governed by general
psychological laws . Thus, if two people had the same attributes and
experiences they would have the same utility functions . The problem of
interpersonal comparisons of utility which is necessary in estimating a social
welfare function reduces to intrapersonal comparisons of utility which are
comparisons
. . . between the utility level I myself do now enjoy, and the utility level
I myself would enjoy under certain hypotheticals, namely if I were
placed in your physical, economic, and social position, and also had
my biological background replaced by yours . (Harsanyi, 1974, p . 601)
The social welfare function "must express what this individual prefers
(or, rather, would prefer) on the basis of impersonal social considerations
alone" (Harsanyi, 1955, p . 315). The utility function
must express what he actually prefers, whether on the basis of his
personal interests or on any other basis . The former (the social welfare
function) may be called his "ethical" preferences, the latter (the utility
function) his "subjective" preferences. (Harsanyi, 1955, p . 315)
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Harsanyi maintains that it is reasonable and appropriate 'in making moral
judgments for an individual to estimate what an individual's utility would
be if that individual were in the objective place of another with that other's
subjective preferences .
Our individual social welfare functions may not correspond to the
average utility function for a society due to a lack of several kinds of
knowledge . We may have insufficient knowledge of the general
psychological laws by which individuals learn their preferences . We may
have incomplete or erroneous information about the attributes and
experiences of others. We also may not know how the utility functions of
others are distributed in society . But if such knowledge and information
were widely held in society and if all individuals were concerned with
maximizing their utility then Harsanyi argues there will be a convergence of
the individual social welfare functions in the society .
To sum up, the more complete our factual information and the ,more
completely individualistic our ethics, the more the different individ-
uals' social welfare functions will converge toward the same objective
quality, namely the unweighted sum (or rather the unweighted,arith-
metic mean) of all individual utilities . This follows both from (either
of two alternative sets of) ethical postulates based on commonly
accepted individualistic, ethical value judgments and from the mere
logical analysis of a social welfare function . (Harsanyi, 1955, p. 320)
Harsanyi formally proves that if certain conditions are met an
individual's social welfare function will converge with the social welfare
functions of others in society equal to "the arithmetical mean of the utilities
of all individuals in the society," thus the term average utilitarianism
(Harsanyi, 1955, p . 316) .
It is instructive to consider a point made by Sen (1968) about Harsanyi's
emphasis on impersonality or the convergence of all social welfare functions
on the mean of the utility functions in society. The impersonality criterion is
that an individual would choose the average social situation if he did not
know what position he would have in the society and had an equal chance of
occupying any position. Following Sen, let there be two states of nature and
two individuals :
Welfare of 1
	
Welfare of 2
State x 1 0
State y
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Given the impersonality criterion, an individual would be indifferent
between choosing state x or state y because each has the expected average
utility, '/2 . But if someone values equality as such, then state y will clearly be
preferred .
It would appear that in social choices we are interested not only in the
mathematical expectation of welfare with impersonality, but also with
the exact distribution of that welfare over individuals . (Sen, 1968,
p. 143)
In statistical terminology the concern stated by Sen is not only with the
mean utility in a society but also with the variance in the distribution of
utilities and, possibly, with other moments of the distribution as well . Our
concern is not just with the average social welfare function in the society on
which the individual social welfare functions should converge, but also with
the distribution of social welfare functions for different groups (or possibly
individuals) in the society . Up to now average utilitarianism has not
incorporated postulates that would constrain these distributions .
Given social justice defined in terms of average utilitarianism, what
objectives and experiences might a curriculum designer consider if the Tyler
rationale and Bloom hierarchy were followed? Cognitively, students should
learn Harsanyi's position. Students should be able to state the premises,
arguments, and conclusions including the key theorem that each individual
ignorant of their status in society would choose the average utility function
of society . Students should also be able to interpret Harsanyi's argument
for themselves and apply it in their society . This means they should be able
to state unambiguously their subjective preferences or utility functions and
accurately estimate the mean utility function for society. The first would
require increased self-awareness and might be achieved through experiences
such as value clarification and reflective inquiry .
Estimating the mean utility function for society is more involved .
Harsanyi notes that we have two indicators of the utility others attach to
different situations : (1) their choices, and (2) their expressions of
satisfaction or dissatisfaction as a result of each choice (Harsanyi, 1955, p .
317). Students, then, should learn about the social choices of individuals
and groups in society and the extent to which they are satisfied or
dissatisfied with their choices . Young men growing up in eastern Kentucky
may choose to go down into the mines, but they also may not express
satisfaction with that choice . Some senior citizens retire to Arizona or
Florida and appear to be quite satisfied; others live close to subsistence
levels and are very dissatisfied with their lot. The disadvantaged, whether
due to ethnicity, race, sex, religion, or handicap, often find certain choices
foreclosed to them due to various forms of discrimination . Students need
information about situations like these. They need actual information
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about the status, expectations, and degree of satisfaction of others in order
to estimate accurately a social welfare function .
At a more general level, following Harsanyi, students should have some
knowledge of the psychological principles by which all individuals learn
preferences . Thus material about socialization, the inter-generational
transmission of values, and the effects of peers on preferences should also
be part of teaching social justice . In this fashion students should learn
something about the processes by which they and others learn their utility
functions .
In order to learn about average utilitarianism and apply its ideas to
themselves and their society students will necessarily attend and respond to
its central ideas. Attending and responding, of course, are low level
affective objectives according to Bloom et al . (1956) . Commitment to social
justice as average utilitarianism is a higher level affective outcome. If
students are committed to average utilitarianism, then they should be
psychologically disposed to empathize with others in their society . This
suggests role reversal activities, reading the literature of other groups and of
their experiences, and the inclusion of any experiences that would increase
the connectedness between, students and others who do not share their
situation in society . Since the goal is to estimate the mean utility function in
society and because average utilitarianism is not concerned with questions
of social distribution, it is not necessary for students to empathize with
individuals at the social extremes .
This relaxes the extent to which students should be able to empathize with
others . Since empathy is a rather elusive quality this less demanding
requirement may have a realistic chance of being achieved .
JOHN RAWLS ON THE SOCIAL CONTRACT
John Rawls' A Theory of Justice is a brilliant and complex attempt to
develop a social contractual view of justice . As noted by Rawls himself,
utilitarianism, mainly in the writings of economists, has been the dominant
school of thought on this subject in recent times . What Rawls has attempted
to do "is to generate and carry to a higher order of abstraction the
traditional theory of the social contract as represented by Locke, Rousseau
and Kant" (Rawls, 1971, p . 11). Some -highlights of Rawls' argument will be
discussed, but the position in its entirety goes far beyond our present
purposes .
Since Rawls sets out to develop a theory of justice on the basis of a social
contract, what do the members of Rawls' society contract among
themselves? The contract concerns the selection of principles of justice that
provides the basis upon which social institutions will be chosen . These
principles of justice are selected in the original position behind a veil of
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ignorance where members of society are ignorant of their actual positions in
that society .
The original position is understood as a purely hypothetical situation
characterized so as to lead to a certain conception of justice . Among
the essential features of this situation is that no one knows his place in
society, his class position or social status, nor does anyone know his
fortune in the distribution of natural assets and abilities, his intelli-
gence, strength and the like . I shall even assume that parties do not
know their conceptions of the good or their special psychological
propensities. The principles of justice are chosen behind a veil of
ignorance . (Rawls, 1971, p . 12)
The veil of ignorance is, of course, similar to but more demanding than
Harsanyi's impersonality criterion . Because everyone is treated equally and
in ignorance of their actual status in the original position the principles of
justice so chosen are fair . Thus the origin of the term, justice as fairness .
Once in the original position, how does one go about selecting principles
of justice? According to Rawls, one would choose two principles that are in
effect a maximin solution to the problem of social justice .
The maximin rule tells us to rank alternatives by their worst possible
outcomes : we are to adopt the alternative the worst outcome of which
is superior to the worst outcomes of others. (Rawls, 1971, pp . 152-53)
Because in the original position we have no idea of our position in society
and no way to calculate the likelihood that we will end up with any given
status or characteristics, it is, then, rational to base our choice of principles
on the maximin principle .
The two principles of justice so chosen are :
First Principle : Each person is to have an equal right to the most exten-
sive total system of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar
system of liberties for all .
Second Principle: Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged
so that they are both : (a) to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged
and (b) attached to offices and positions open to all under
conditions of fair equality of opportunity . (Rawls, 1971, p . 302)
It is obvious that the two principles, unqualified, may lead to contradictory
preferences . Rawls offers some priority rules to solve these conflicts . First,
these principles are lexicographically ordered, the first principle must
always be chosen and take precedence over the second . Second, the second
or difference principle, is prior to other parts of his system, such as the
principle of maximum efficiency. Together these principles combine to
provide a general conception of justice .
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All social primary goods-liberty and opportunity, income and wealth,
and the bases of self-respect-are to be distributed equally unless an
unequal distribution of any or all of these goods is to the advantage
of the least favored . (Rawls, 1971, p . 303)
Assuming that this exceedingly brief summary sufficiently distinguishes
Rawls' thought from that of Harsanyi, a word is in order concerning some
of the criticisms that have been directed to Rawls. Much has been made of
his use of the maximin rule for choice under uncertainty in the original
position . Consider Sen's illustration of two situations x and y, and two
individuals, A and B :
Welfare of A
	
Welfare of B
State x 10 1
State y 20 1
The maximin criterion is indifferent between situations x and y although
state y is preferred under average utilitarianism . This suggests that the
maximin criterion is insensitive to certain distributional characteristics . This
is indeed the case. Consider a second illustration of Sen's :
The maximin rule leads us to choose y even though C is only made slightly
better off and B is made much worse off. In the first example the maximin
criterion only led us to be indifferent between two situations with different
average utilities; in the latter case the maximin criterion leads us to choose
the situation with the lowest average utility .
Our values about inequality cannot be adequately reflected in the maxi-
min rule, because an exclusive concern with the well-being of the worst-
off individual, or the worst-off group of individuals hides various
other issues related to equality . (Sen, 1970, p . 139)
Thus, Rawls behooves us to look at institutions which look out for the least
advantaged while ignoring other aspects of the social distribution of goods .
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Welfare of A Welfare of B Welfare of C
State x 100 80 60
State y 100 61 61
Given social justice as depicted by Rawls, what objectives and experi-
ences might a curriculum designer choose following Tyler and Bloom?
Cognitively, students should learn Rawls' position . They should be able to
describe the original position and the veil of ignorance and explain how this
constitutes justice as fairness . Students should be able to apply the
principles of justice, especially the difference principle, in choosing among
social institutions .
The more complicated objective, which has an affective component,
involves developing the student's sense of justice . Rawls works from an
intuitive sense of justice in creating the original position and the veil of
ignorance in constructing justice as fairness ; he begins with a notion of what
is fair. The task for the curriculum developer and teacher would be the
reverse of this, working from justice as fairness to bringing the student's
intuitive sense of justice in line with Rawls . No experienced educator would
consider this an easy task and it is not obvious what experiences except
careful consideration of his arguments would be most productive along
these lines .
The burden of providing factual information about individuals and
groups in society is much less demanding with Rawls than with Harsanyi .
The focus in the present instance is with the least advantaged, therefore
factual information should be provided about the least advantaged and
social scientific explanations should be offered concerning processes
leading to their deprivation . It is through knowledge of this sort that
students would apply justice as fairness in concrete situations .
It was noted that value clarification exercises were consistent with a study
of average utilitarianism . Value clarification would seem to have little place
in teaching Rawls' theory of justice . It simply does not matter what your
utility function is . The important values are specified in the principles of
justice and it is the job of the educator to bring attitudes, beliefs, and
behaviors of students in line with them .
ROBERT NOZICK ON LIBERTARIANISM
Individuals have rights, and there are things no person or group may
do to them (without violating their rights). (Nozick, 1974, p . ix)
With this Robert Nozick sets out, in Anarchy, State and Utopia, to
develop a political philosophy and view of social justice from a libertarian
perspective . The view of social justice promoted by Nozick is a form of
distributive justice called entitlement theory . If the world were wholly just
the following principles would obtain :
1 . A person who acquires a holding in accordance with the principle of
justice in acquisition is entitled to that holding .
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2. A person who acquires a holding in accordance with the principle of
justice in transfer, from someone else entitled to that holding, is
entitled to that holding .
3. No one is entitled to a holding except by (repeated) applications of
1 and 2. (Nozick, 1974, p. 151)
Because he is aware of injustice in acquisition, such as fraud, cheating, or
stealing, an additional principle is put forth, the rectification of injustice in
holdings . When the rectification principle is in operation, one attempts to
estimate what the distribution of holdings would be if the injustice had not
occurred .
Nozick argues that a "current time-slice analysis" of the distribution of
valuables or primary goods is excessively narrow and myopic, unlike Rawls
who focuses on social institutions which would maximize the position of the
least well off . Nozick maintains that one cannot evaluate a distribution
without knowing how things got that way . Furthermore, if one chooses to
maintain a given distribution, or minimum, as does Rawls, one is
continuously forced to coerce individuals and limit their freedom of choice
(Nozick, 1974, pp . 153-66). Therefore, in order to determine whether a
given distribution is just, one must look at how it came about; one must
look at its history. Then the distribution, if justly conceived, should not be
altered if such changes would violate the rights of any individual .
Arguments are frequently offered, such as those advanced by Rawls,
attacking current distributions of goods and favoring various forms of
equality or equality of opportunity . Nozick does not find these compelling .
In the first place, he notes equality is hardly ever argued for, instead it is
simply stated as the first postulate . As for equality of opportunity, Nozick
rejects the oft put forward analogy between life chances and a race . We
never start together and are not going for the same finish line . Which seems
oddly compatible with Harsanyi's assumption about the separate utility
functions which each of us develop and carry with us . Therefore, he argues,
we cannot push some people back and others ahead to some imaginary
starting line .
Furthermore, Nozick continues, consider some of the situations which
are created when some of Rawls' arguments are taken seriously .
If the woman who later became my wife rejected another suitor (whom
she otherwise would have married) for me, partially because (I leave
aside my loveable nature) of my keen intelligence and good looks,
neither of which did I earn, would the rejected less intelligent and less
handsome suitor have a legitimate complaint about unfariness? Would
my thus impeding the other suitor's winning the hand of fair lady
justify taking some resources from others to pay for cosmetic surgery
for him and special intellectual training, or to pay to develop in him
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some sterling trait that I lack in order to equalize our chances of being
chosen? . . .No such consequences follow . (Against whom would the
rejected suitor have a legitimate complaint? Against what?) . (Nozick,
1974, p . 237)
The major objection Nozick raises against rights to equality of
opportunity is that these "rights require a substructure of things and
materials and actions ; and other people may have rights and entitlements
over these" (Nozick, 1974, p . 238). Needless to say Nozick's entitlement
theory asserts a radically different view of social justice from either average
utilitarianism or justice as fairness .
As brilliant as his attacks on Rawls and as engaging as his
counterarguments are, Nozick's thought is probably the least developed of
these three positions on social justice . As Nozick claims about arguments
for equality, his entitlement theory is more asserted than argued for .
The subject of justice in holdings consists of three major topics . The
first is the original acquisition of holdings, the appropriation of unheld
things. This includes the issues of how unheld things may come to be
held, the process, or processes, by which unheld things may come to be
held by these processes, the extent of what comes to be held by a
particular process and so on. We shall refer to the complicated truth
about this topic, which we shall not formulate here, as the principle of
justice in acquisition. (Nozick, 1974, p. 154; the latter emphasis added)
Given Nozick's emphasis on the historical development or evolution of
contemporary distributions, how can we evaluate the justice of current
distributions if we have no theory of just acquisitions . He does introduce
the principle of rectification in holdings, but this is of little use if we do not
know how to distinguish just from unjust holdings . How is an injustice to
be rectified if we have no framework from which to evaluate it?
Entitlement theory does offer some guidelines to just social relations even
though they may be incomplete. It is interesting, for example, that Nozick
and Rawls might advocate similar social policies in the name of justice but
for different reasons . Consider Rawls helping the least advantaged in
society where the least advantaged ended up where they are through
previous injustices which Nozick would rectify . Black Ameicans and Native
Americans might fit both conditions . But several things are not clear about
the principle of rectification . How far into the past are we obligated to go in
the search for injustices? Ten years? Fifty years? Two hundred years? Five
hundred years? Against what standard are we to assess the injustices done
to a group? How does one make the "best estimate of subjective
information about what would have occurred . . . if the injustice had not
taken place" (Nozick, 1974, pp . 152-53) . What calculus are we to use in
assessing the consequences of these counterfactuals?
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Given Nozick's discussion of entitlement theory and following Tyler and
Bloom, what objectives and experiences would be selected in teaching social
justice? Cognitively, students should be able to state the three key principles
of entitlement theory . Students should also be able to state criticisms of
transfers that violate a person's rights and criticisms of arguments for
equality and equality of opportunity .
Factual information and knowledge about historical developments is
important in teaching applications of entitlement theory. Students should
be able to identify past injustices in acquisition on the basis of which current
transfers might be made. Of course this is a difficult matter . How far back
does one go? How does one calculate how much of current holdings are to
be transferred according to the principle of rectification? Nevertheless, this
is one way to social justice if transfers are involved . Whereas Harsanyi and
Rawls are interested with "current time-slice" estimates of one sort or
another, Nozick has us look to the past . It is likely that most of us can make
some claim as a result of some past injustice of some sort, the question is
how to evaluate these claims and weigh them against each other . Students
would become as moral philosophers looking at historical events . This
seems like a difficult task but it may be no more difficult than estimating the
average utility function in society or estimating the minimum level of
utilities on multiple dimensions .
It may be, however, that cognitive objectives are less important than
affective outcomes in this case . Affectively, students should develop a set
of attitudes, beliefs, and dispositions that would include a strong sense of
property rights, the inviolability of contracts, a disinclination to tamper
with existing holdings or distributions, and a strong sense of individualism .
Some of these are attitudes ; others are an explicit commitment to a specific
type of social order, one built on individual initiative and property . It is not
clear exactly what experiences would produce these attitudes, beliefs, and
dispositions . In fact, it seems easier to identify experiences that are not
likely to lead to these outcomes . For example, value clarification, role
reversal activities, the development of empathy for others, the estimation of
minimum or average utilities, and reflective inquiry, all would seem
unrelated to this view of social justice . What might be central is a social
view that continually emphasizes the importance of the individual,
individual initiative and rights, and the necessity to limit governmental
activities to a minimum . But this is more of an answer to a question than a
guide for curriculum development . One could possibly associate only
positive sentiments with these positions and not provide an opportunity to
explore alternative social arrangements .
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THE PLURALITY/EMERGENCE ASSUMPTION
Before proceeding, a summary of the argument to this point might be
useful. Linear models of curriculum and course development, whose origins
can be traced to Tyler, have been influential in recent thinking about
curriculum theory . But the utility of linear models depend upon clearly
stated learning objectives which rest upon terminal behaviors . Learning
objectives themselves can be divided into terminal or enabling objectives .
The terminal behavior of a terminal objective must be a sufficient condition
for attaining that objective . But because an enabling objective is only
instrumental to attaining a terminal objective, it is the only necessary
condition for a terminal objective .
A distinction is now in order . The distinction is between a sufficient
condition for curriculum development and a sufficient condition for
student learning . In the case of curriculum, a sufficient condition refers to
the development of materials and experiences which capture key character-
istics of the subject being taught, one hesitates to say structure . Materials
and experiences are adjudged sufficient to the extent they reflect the
substance, findings, dilemmas, and mode of thought and investigation of a
field of study ; the relevant comparison is between the curriculum and the
content area. A sufficient condition with respect to student learnings is
quite different . Whether a condition is sufficient for learning to occur
depends on a match between the student as an organism and the materials
and experiences that are processed . Therefore, a sufficient condition for the
development of materials and experiences essentially resides in a
correspondence between curriculum materials and experiences and the
subject matter . A sufficient condition for learning, however, is a complex,
applied problem in educational research .
The discussion of social justice in the work of Harsanyi, Rawls, and
Nozick was presented to determine whether terminal behavior could be
stated which is a sufficient condition for attaining a learning objective
about the substantive meaning of social justice . It is possible to state what
such a learning objective might be, for example,
On the basis of reading, discussing, or analyzing positions on social
justice, students will be able to describe and defend a just social or
political system . An acceptable level of performance is the description
of a system against which no counter-examples based on the values of
greatest average utility, equality, or personal rights can be offered .
It is not possible to meet this level of performance . These standards may be
significantly relaxed and they still could not be met because the subject does
not permit it . This does not mean that social justice should not be studied, it
only means that linear models that would push in the direction of this
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objective are not appropriate to teaching social justice . They do not do
justice, as it were, to the topic . Necessary conditions for the study of social
justice can be stated, however, such as, describe Harsanyi's social welfare
function, state Rawls' two principles of justice, or list the three principles in
Nozick's entitlement theory . It is also relatively easy to specify process
behaviors, compare and contrast Rawls' theory of justice with Nozick's
entitlement theory . But necessary conditions and process behaviors
side-step terminal substantive questions of justice .
Some of the current controversy in curriculum theory is almost certainly
caused by confounding necessary and sufficient conditions in learning
objectives . Those who advocate the use of learning objectives must assume
that sufficient conditions for attaining a learning objective can be specified .
But Pinar (1975) and those he refers to as the reconceptualists seem to argue
that sufficient conditions cannot always be stated, although their arguments
are couched in different, continental philosophical traditions . It is hard for
these debates to be joined because the two groups make different initial
assumptions, ask different questions, work from philosophical positions
that are quite removed from one another, and their questions admit
radically different answers. If the previous arguments are correct, then the
simpler distinction between necessary and sufficient conditions for attaining
a learning objective should explain to some degree (1) the widespread
influence of linear curriculum models and major criticisms of them, and
(2) the meta-theoretical interests of the reconceptualists .
Now it is time to return to our other major theme, social justice, and
relate it to what has just been argued about curriculum theory . If it is not .
possible to state sufficient conditions for attaining substantive social justice
terminal learning objectives, then an additional curricular assumption must
be made. The Plurality/Emergence assumption is offered to increase the fit
between an approach to curriculum design and the teaching of social
justice, a fit that is lacking when linear models are considered .
The Plurality/Emergence Assumption :
Given: (i) subject matter which focuses on questions of social value,
(ii) lack of agreement on terminal behaviors,
(iii) desire to avoid authoritarian advocacy of values, then a
curriculum developer should explicitly present multiple value
positions in materials and experiences and some subset of .
objectives and outcomes should emerge in classroom analysis
and discussion.
Conditions (i) and (ii) reflect the nature of scholarly thinking about social
justice that has already been described . Condition (iii) originates from two
sources . First, it, like conditions (i) and (ii), corresponds to patterns of
thought in the field of ethical philosophy itself. Conceptions of social
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justice, it has been shown, develop gradually from intuitive beginnings, are
refined by example and counter-example, and are assessed against other
points of view. There is no clearly superior position although some
conceptualizations may come out better than others on certain dimensions
such as internal consistency, breadth of application, and so forth .
Therefore, condition (iii) parallels thought in this area itself .
The second argument for condition (iii) relates to broader social
considerations . This essay is written for education in open and pluralistic
societies . Questions of values are continuously being raised and resolved in
innumerable settings . Therefore, it is not appropriate to let curriculum
developers arbitrarily explicate a narrow range of values to the exclusion of
others . In closed, totalitarian societies condition (iii) would not be
acceptable, in fact it is almost certain to be unacceptable to both right- and
left-wing authoritarians in open societies .
Objectives, experiences, and evaluations are emergent to the extent that
students, teachers, and others are allowed to participate in their generation .
This is the only way to satisfy condition (iii) and the subject matter dictates
of conditions (i) and (ii) . Conversely, if the curriculum developer chooses
authoritatively to dictate which values will be included in materials and
experiences, then linear models can be followed straight off even though the
subject matter content would be seriously distorted in the process .
The Plurality/Emergence assumption, in combination with Tyler's
scheme, does not guarantee that a complete set of necessary and sufficient
conditions are now satisfied but at least the matter of sufficiency has been
addressed . What is needed is a meta-theory of sufficient conditions for
curriculum development so that one will recognize a set of sufficient
conditions when they have been formulated .
Substantively, the Plurality/Emergence assumption has a number of
general and specific implications for the teaching of social justice and
values. At a general level curriculum development can no longer be
viewed as an activity remote from the classroom . The sense of authority
conferred on curriculum developers that is fostered by the physical, social,
and intellectual distance between curriculum developers and students will be
undermined by the Plurality/Emergence assumption . Curriculum develop-
ments will now be encouraged in the classroom . Secondly, with respect to
matters of social value, the educational process can no longer be viewed as a
set of linear, recursive activities going from the developer to the teacher to
the student. Henceforth, when deviations are made from models such as
Tyler's model for certain kinds of materials students will be encouraged to
differentiate among types of content . For example, geographical
information cannot be viewed in the same way as questions of value .
Specific implications of the Plurality/Emergence assumption for social
justice include three kinds of interaction effects . As objectives and
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outcomes emerge in classroom discussions of social justice there will be
interactions among : (1) social class, ethnic, racial, and sexual character-
istics of students and their views on social justice ; (2) contemporary, social
issues and what is said about _social values ; and (3) an interaction of the
characteristics of (1) and the issues of (2) . It is not empirically possible to
consider questions of value behind a "veil of ignorance," even though
Rawls posits this as a condition for fairness. Student reaction to issues of
social justice will obviously be conditioned and influenced by norms and
values they have previously internalized and accepted . Questions of
entitlements and redistribution of goods will likewise produce reactions and
comments that are context related. Current social issues whether they are
about matters of equality of opportunity, educational programs for the
disadvantaged, or efforts to limit tax increases will channel and influence
classroom discussions .
CLASSROOM DISCOURSE AS CURRICULUM DEVELOPMENT
With the addition of the Plurality/Emergence assumption, the Tyler
scheme has been extended to include objectives and outcomes that emerge
from classroom discussion . Another way of conceptualizing this is to think
of classroom discourse as curriculum development.
A discourse is not just a, discussion or series of discussions, but a series of
discussions that involves a long, reasoned, reflective treatment of a subject .
This transcends the notion of simply .discussing the pros and cons of an
issue. Discussions are confined to class periods or segments thereof but a
discourse -continues and is re-engaged at later times and extended to other
topics. Because a classroom discussion can be defined and constrained its
outcomes can be evaluated in a rather straightforward manner . But a
classroom discourse about social justice poses problems which the use of
such well-known devices as terminal behaviors, tests, and criterion
standards beg, at least with respect to emergent objectives, experiences, and
evaluations . How does one evaluate a discourse on social justice and value?
Evaluations cannot be made without measurements . All measurements
are based on some underlying measurement model which in turn is based on
a meta-theory which includes a conceptualization of what constitutes an
appropriate measure. To provide for a complete evaluation of discourse
about social justice one needs, in descending order of generality : (1) a meta-
theory of reasoned discourse about social justice, (2) an appropriate
measurement model(s), and (3) measurement instruments. This is a tall
order and its inherent complexity and attendant problems may be one factor
in turning curriculum theorists and developers from the consideration of
sufficient conditions . To spell out features of the latter two steps goes
beyond the curricular focus of this essay but a consideration of a meta-
theory of discourse about social justice is central to it .,
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Toulmin (1950) argues that one engages in moral reasoning in either of
two ways . First, one may seek to justify a particular pattern of action by
showing that it belongs to a class of actions that is subsumed under an
acceptable moral rule or principle . For example, one might show that Head-
start programs for the educationally disadvantaged belong to a class of
actions which are subsumed under Rawls' difference principle, that "social
and economic institutions' inequalities are to be arranged so that they are . . .
to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged ." Toulmin's second form of
moral reasoning explores whether the consequences of accepting a rule or
principle are compatible with the ultimate function of ethics, the
harmonization of interests . The last point, the harmonization of interests as
the ultimate function of ethics, is quite controversial . We offer an alter-
native, the consequences of particular actions should be consistent with
other well developed ideas about social justice or well-reasoned exceptions
should be provided .
Hare (1963) states that a moral principle is to be rejected if its deduced
consequences are unacceptable . Whether the outcome is acceptable is
determined by the degree to which it conforms to our ideas about justice,
fairness, and so on . Thus moral reasoning for Hare is not a strictly linear,
deductive process . Instead, it involves a continual assessment of the
outcome of a situation, the "facts of the matter," against different notions
of what is just . Moral reasoning is not like the proofs of formal logic or
even scientific reasoning .
It is obvious that a search for a first principle of justice is doomed to fail
because it would lead to an infinite regress . One might always ask for a
justification of the last principle upon which people agree . This distin-
guishing characteristic of the research for principles of social justice
requires that the Plurality/Emergence assumption, or something like it, be
added to the Tyler model .
It is important to identify the general nature of the logic of ethical
reasoning . What we encounter is a circular investigation from a general
principle to the policies and outcomes it subsumes and then to an
assessment of these policies and outcomes against other principles . There is
a circularity here but it need not be a trivial tautology nor a vicious
circularity. Since a search for first principles seems to be ultimately
unproductive we are left with intuitive ideas about justice and fairness as a
starting place . Information, knowledge, and logic are then used to develop
these ideas which in turn must withstand the criticism of counter-examples
and alternative conceptions. The movement is continually between
principles and outcomes . The logic is not as well formulated as that of
deductive proofs nor as free of general principles as induction by
enumeration . But any discourse on social justice and values, whether in the
classroom or elsewhere, should also follow this pattern if it is to be true to
the nature of the subject .
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Toulmin and Hare are concerned, for the most part, with meta-ethics,
how ethical arguments should be put together, and not with ethics, which
arguments are ethically correct, although Toulmin does slide into ethics
when harmonization of interests, is advocated . These - approaches can be
used to guide classroom discourse about social justice . But more than an
appreciation of meta-ethics is needed to evaluate classroom discourse, a
rigorous view of discourse itself is needed . How can we tell if a discourse on
any subject is progressive and useful or degenerative . These considerations
should include germaneness of content, reflective use of examples and
counter-examples, application of the rules of logic, reliance on accurate,
factual information, use of corroborated explanations of social behavior,
and so on . But one should not be misled into thinking that a meta-ethic or a
critical view of discourse provide a neutral vantage point from which to
view the. world . The considerations just outlined may not 'contain the
specific commitments of the normative -theories of - Harsanyi, Rawls, or
Nozick, but they do contain 'commitments 'to rationality, science, and
a reliance upon the consideration of alternative, intuitive meanings of
justice and fairness . What we have then is a characterization of positive
discourse and a meta-ethic of moral argument .
CLASSROOM DISCOURSE: AN OVERVIEW
Given the fluid nature of discourse, how might it proceed and be
evaluated? Following the presentation of . basic ideas concerning social
justice, a student and teacher may disagree about the "justice" of the
graduated income tax . One agrees with Nozick's libertarian view that one is
entitled to keep what one earns or at the very least all should contribute an
equal percentage of income to the government and that transfer payments
through welfare should be drastically reduced . The other agrees with Rawls
that "just" social institutions should be designed with the welfare of the
least advantaged in mind . Not only should the graduated income tax and
welfare transfers be maintained they should be increased to equalize further
the distribution of wealth and its correlates . How might this be evaluated?
In the Tyler and Bloom traditions one might be satisfied to determine if
the students can : (1) state Rawls' and Nozick's arguments, (2) state major
criticisms and rebuttals of each, (3) identify social institutions and
arrangements which exhibit these characteristics, and (4) suggest changes in
existing institutions to make them conform to either position . One might
reasonably ask if these same objectives would be appropriate if Hitler's
Mein Kampf were being studied . The point is that the technology and meta-
ethic of the Tyler formulation is blind to questions of substance and value .
This type of evaluation makes two clearly political commitments . The first
implication is an implicit acceptance of things-as-they-are, the status quo of
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social institutions . The second bias is the endorsement of ethical relativism,
a perversion of liberalism that one opinion is as good as another . The
curriculum developer as technologist makes both of these commitments .
"But," one may respond, "we can simply restrict the values and positions
that will be considered in the materials ." This response, however, fails to
satisfy condition (iii) of the Pluralist/Emergence assumption and would
reject those arguments in support of it .
If one were to use the characteristics of positive discourse and the meta-
ethical ideas of Toulmin and Hare to evaluate the classroom discussion
outlined above, one would ultimately ask quite different questions from
Tyler/Bloom type . First, it should be noted one would be interested in the
quality of the discussion as a discussion before considering the ethical issues
as such. Are the necessary conditions for a consideration of social justice
met? The quality of the discussion could be evaluated in the Tyler and
Bloom manner suggested above . Are the positions accurately stated? Are
the facts describing the policies accurate and complete? Are the arguments
logical and complete? Has attention been reflectively given to supporting
examples and challenging counter-examples? But these only address the
necessary conditions for a discussion of social justice and in themselves
contain inappropriate political commitments for the study of social justice
in an open, pluralistic society .
Following the evaluation of the discussion as a discussion one can use
meta-ethical notions from Toulmin and Hare, among others, to evaluate
the nature of the ethical argument . Substantively one wants to know to
what class of social policies does the graduated income tax belong and what
principle(s) subsume these policies . With which alternative conceptions of
social justice are the consequences of the graduated income tax consistent?
Would alternative taxation policies be more congruent with a particular
view of social justice? What are the major alternatives with respect to
taxation policy and which principles subsume each? Which principles
support welfare transfer payments and what is their congruence with
principles behind alternative taxation plans? Two observations are in order .
First, the answers to these questions are not necessarily determinate,
therefore, an evaluation relying solely on behavioral objectives would be
misguided . Second, these questions are not value free . Just as meta-ethical
implications of the Tyler scheme contain certain political values, the
meta-ethic behind these questions also contain value commitments . But this
meta-ethic is more appropriate to the study of social justice than is Tyler's
because it comes from the study of ethical philosophy itself . In curriculum
development there is not a single meta-theory appropriate for all areas, but
that is what the Tyler rationale implies .
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CONCLUSION
The study of social justice requires, having accepted the Plurality/
Emergence assumption, the capacity to let unanticipated objectives and
outcomes emerge as discourse continues along with a critical view of
discourse and a meta-ethic which-allows one to evaluate the discourse . Such
a meta-ethic cannot be neutral but it need not be narrowly or unreflectively
biased . What we are left with is the notion of teachers and students as social
philosophers with the freedom, ability, and inclination to think rationally
and reflectively about social justice . Linear curriculum models can capture
some of the things philosophers do and think but if we are to avoid narrow
social and political authoritarianism we must use them as a beginning and
not the end of curriculum theory and development, concerning questions of
social value .
A final comment is in order. A linear approach ,to curriculum when
matched against problems and issues in teaching . social justice has been
found to be lacking . It fell short because the model did not conform to the
subject matter . For this reason the Plurality/Emergence assumption was
put forward. It was also argued that linear models only suggest necessary
conditions for developing curriculum . The addition of the Plurality/
Emergence assumption changed the meta-ethical base making it more
appropriate for the study of social justice . What is implied by this argument
is that different models of curriculum development are -appropriate for
different subject matters and that additional assumptions resting on
different meta-theories or meta-ethics may be appropriate for different
tasks. Curriculum models should be complementary to the subject matter at
some meta-level . The search for additional assumptions is a philosophical,
epistemological endeavor that is required if curriculum theorists are to
continue the successful specification of sufficient conditions necessary . for
curriculum development .
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